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Chapter 1
INBREEDING AND THE ACADEMIC LABOR MARKET
Recent attention to the need for the inclusion of minorities 
and women in the professoriate has fostered renewed interest in 
the operation of the academic marketplace. Initially, this atten­
tion was directed at entry-level faculty selection. However, as 
larger numbers of minority and female faculty have accrued longer 
periods of service, the mechanisms and criteria for promotion and 
tenure decisions have also become a subject of concern. An example 
of the recognition of the need for research on post-selection deci­
sion processes can be found in the lament that "the relationship 
of affirmative action to tenure has not been tackled by any appli­
cant" in a 1977 report from the Fund for the Improvement of Post­
secondary Education (The Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary 
Education, 1977, p. 3).
The Problem
In response to the need for further research on promotion and 
tenure decisions, this study has examined one of the criteria used 
in these decisions: inbreeding. The relevance of this characteris­
tic, which has been largely ignored in recent studies, was demon­
strated by the inclusion of a provision that the University of 
Minnesota waive its policy of not hiring its graduates for tenured 
positions in the consent decree settling a recent sex discrimina-
1
2tion suit that attracted national attention (Broad, 1980).
The merits of institutional inbreeding have been a subject of 
controversy in the higher education literature for sometime. In 
his University Administration, first published in 1908, Charles W. 
Eliot assessed the practice:
It is natural, but not wise, for a college or university 
to recruit its faculties chiefly from its own graduates—  
natural, because these graduates are well known to the 
selecting authorities, since they have been under 
observation for years; unwise, because breeding in and 
in has grave dangers for a university [p. 90].
Institutional origin has been used in selection, retention, promo­
tion, and tenure decisions. Caplow and McGee (1958) noted the 
effects of origin in their classic study, The Academic Marketplace: 
"Rules about ’inbreeding' and 'outbreeding' also account for a 
fair number of involuntary terminations, the former being far more 
common than the latter.... [inbreeding] is commonly disapproved 
but widely practiced [p. 41]."
Inbreeding is important in any examination of wage and occupa­
tional discrimination because of its major impact on women. It 
was included in the list of issues compiled by the Association of 
American College's Project on the Status and Education of Women: 
"Policies that forbid departments from hiring their own students 
upon degree completion decrease the available pool of qualified
3female applicants and work a particular hardship on married women 
who may not be mobile [Sandler, 1974, p. 7]." The same concerns 
were expressed by Gappa and Uehling (1979) in their monograph on 
women in academe. They lament the
lack of evidence about the effect of inbreeding policies.
Some researchers have suggested that as women typically 
move where their spouses find employment, they are 
limited in their choice of institutions at which they 
can complete graduate work. Rules prohibiting the 
hiring of an institution's own graduates effectively 
limit the opportunities for such women for employment 
[1979, p. 51].
Lack of mobility due to marital or familial constraints is the most 
often cited reason for inbreeding among women faculty. Despite the 
rise in dual-career marriages and the emphasis on equality, most 
location decisions are resolved in favor of the male's job. Wives 
who follow the standard pattern of supporting their spouse through 
his graduate work and then pursuing their own advanced work at the 
institution at which he takes his first job may have little choice 
about where they can seek employment.
Another reason for inbreeding in women faculty members is 
affirmative action pressures. An institution attempting to hire 
nontraditional faculty may find that the easiest applicants to 
attract are their own graduates. Especially in fields where they
4are very rare, the surest way to find a woman or a minority person 
for a faculty slot may be to recruit a graduate student. To the 
extent that this is true and that inbreeding is viewed as a nega­
tive signal in faculty decisions, affirmative action pressure may 
contribute to the poorer performance of nontraditionals within the 
academic community over the long run.
Along with the possibility that it is more likely that women 
are inbred, differential application of inbreeding prohibitions 
leads to occupational discrimination. Joan Abramson (1975) dis­
cusses this possibility:
There is also some evidence that [the inbreeding] policy 
is eased more often for men than for women. My own family 
provides examples of this phenomenon. My husband went 
from graduate student straight up to associate professor 
at Stanford. His career was not set back the least by 
the fear of inbreeding. Indeed, the minute he completed 
his Ph.D. requirements his rank changed from acting 
assistant professor to assistant professor. In contrast, 
my sister was told that UCLA could offer her only a 
lectureship. Even the lectureship was available only 
because she was clearly one of the best qualified Ph.D.s 
in her field for some years. She was told that she was 
lucky that her department had considered breaking the 
rules for her and that the lectureship appointment most
5likely would not be extended beyond a single year 
[p. 6].
Given the bias against inbreeding and given the evidence that women 
may have greater reason to be inbred, it is important to examine 
whether inbreeding is a reasonable variable in tenure, promotion, 
retention, and selection decisions. There are two levels at which 
the question can be approached. First, one can look at the insti­
tutional effects of inbreeding: What are the effects of inbreeding 
on collegial relations, curriculum, and other institutional char­
acteristics? Abramson noted the following:
Many universities refuse to employ their own graduates 
in anything but temporary positions on the assumption 
that . . . inbred departments become stagnant and void 
of the new ideas brought in by cross-fertilization from 
other universities. The theory is in itself less than 
sound, for it assumes that graduates are permanently 
fixed in their thinking by their training [1975, p. 6].
The institutional effects of inbreeding pose some interesting 
research problems, but they are beyond the scope of this study.
The other approach to examining the impact of institutional 
origin is at the level of the individual faculty member. In the 
context of the uncertainty about the treatment of minorities and 
women, this approach leads to the question of whether the policies 
regarding inbreeding lead to discrimination. Consideration of this
6question requires an understanding of the conditions in the academic 
marketplace and an understanding of the theoretical bases for the 
determination of discrimination. For the purposes of this study, 
an economic theory of discrimination provides the theoretical frame­
work. Following some background information on the academic labor 
market, the remainder of the chapter discusses this theory of dis­
crimination and, within that framework, examines inbreeding as a 
job market signal which may lead to discrimination.
The Dilemma in the Academic Labor Market 
A major theme in recent research on and popular discussion of 
faculty concerns is the constriction of the academic labor market. 
Projections of the overall demand for doctoral faculty show strongly 
decreasing trends between 1980 and 1995 (Cartter, 1976; Fernandez, 
1978). Projections of new doctorate hires reflect the same trend. 
Fernandez’s baseline projection (assuming a constant student-faculty 
ratio) shows a downward trend from 10,500 new hires in 1980 to only 
1,000 new hires in 1995. Although this projection is not a mono- 
tonically decreasing curve, it does show a precipitous decline in 
new faculty hiring over the next 15 years. Cartter (.1976) combines 
projections of doctoral completions and junior faculty openings to 
develop a 5-year discounted estimate of the excess or shortage of 
doctoral job seekers. This estimate of faculty openings show the 
same pattern as Fernandez's projection. Cartter predicts 16,100 
junior faculty openings for 1980 and 2,200 for 1990, the last year
7in the projected series. Through the same period, his 5-year dis­
counted excess of doctorate holders rises from 72,700 in 1980 to 
a peak of 122,200 in 1986. By 1990, the surplus is projected to 
have declined to 91,500. Although the Fernandez data for the 
post-1955 period shows increasing demand it is clear that the 
academic market for new hires and junior faculty will not be robust 
in the next 15 years.
At the same time that the total demand and the new doctorate 
hires are rapidly declining, the fraction of faculty holding tenure 
is rising. Although the new faculty openings in the 1980s will be 
few, many people hired in more affluent times will come up for pro­
motion and tenure decisions during that period. The decreasing 
importance of new appointments is shown in Cartter’s analysis of 
the market for junior faculty which projects only 1,200 openings 
in 1984. The same model projected 17,300 hires for 1979 (Cartter, 
1976, p. 143). In 1984, when there is little discretion in the 
management of faculty through openings in the junior ranks, there 
will be a much greater opportunity for decision making at the 
later career stages. Facing a severely depressed market for new 
faculty hires, it is clear that the critical decisions concerning 
faculty in the 1980s and 1990s will be in retention, promotion, and 
tenure.
At the same time, another significant theme in much of the 
literature on the professoriate is the need for a broader range of
8participation. Traditionally, the faculty in postsecondary insti­
tutions have been exclusively or predominantly white and male. 
Exceptions to this demographic trend are few. Some specialties 
hold "pink-collar" status (for example, nursing and home economics) 
but in most departments where a significant proportion of the stu­
dents is female, the faculty is predominantly male (for example, 
elementary or secondary education, English or Art). Predominantly 
black institutions offer an exception to the white and male rule. 
However, the overall impact of these exceptions is slight and there 
is a demonstrated need to incorporate nontraditional faculty (women 
and minorities) into the mainstream of higher education (Carnegie, 
1973; Newman, Note 3, p. 3).
The difficulty of increasing the number of nontraditional 
faculty was observed by Newman:
It has proven far easier to help James Meredith past the 
governor and into the University of Mississippi than it 
has to increase the number of black faculty. It has 
proven easier to increase the number of women attending 
schools of business than the number of women deans of 
schools of business [Note 3, pp. 1-2],
This research will emphasize women as a subset of nontradi­
tional faculty. But while specific structural questions to be 
examined are particularly relevant to women, the general discussion 
of discrimination applies both to women and minorities.
9The real gains In faculty status for women have not been 
large. Bernice Sandler (Note 4, p. 2) has compiled a "Small list 
of horrors":
Although there has been an increase in the number of 
women at the assistant professor level, these gains 
are not matched by gains in promotions; there has been 
no comparable gain in tenured ranks.
In 1977-78, the modal rank for men was full pro­
fessor. For women the modal rank was assistant pro­
fessor.
In 1973, the salary gap between academic men and 
women was 16.7%.
In 1977, it was up to 20.5% and still widening.
There are several indications that a far greater 
percentage of women than men are hired for non-ladder 
positions rather than those leading to tenure.
Women are still promoted more slowly than men.
The unemployment rate for women Ph.D.'s in the 
sciences and social sciences is 2-4 times that of men.
Sandler goes on to summarize her findings, including the observation 
that "the higher the rank, the fewer the women" (Note 4, p. 2).
As the Newman (Note 3) and Sandler (Note 4) quotations imply, 
nontraditional faculty have a "pipeline" problem. Tenured, full 
professor status cannot be achieved overnight, nor can it be in-
10
herited or won by lottery. A necessary, but not sufficient, ingre­
dient in the transformation of an assistant to a full professor is 
time. To increase nontraditional participation in higher faculty 
ranks, women and minorities must not only be recruited but also 
retained, promoted, and tenured.
The goal of increasing the participation of nontraditional 
faculty and the reality of decreasing total demand for faculty are
often in conflict (Linnell, Note 3). Sandler (Note 4, p. 2) notes
the impact of this situation on women:
With the financial crisis in higher education and the 
subsequent cutbacks in some faculties, many women have 
also lost positions, for being less likely to have 
tenure, they have been the first to be terminated.
Given the dismal, near-term predictions for demand for faculty, it
is all too possible that those terminated may not be able to find 
employment in academia. Indeed, the newly-opened door may be a 
revolving one.
The only way to fairly increase nontraditional participation 
in higher ranks, and during times of cutbacks to retain their fair 
representation, is to ensure that retention, promotion, and tenure 
decisions are free from any type of discrimination. An exploration 
of possible discrimination in these decisions requires the selec­
tion of a theory of discrimination.
11
An Economic Theory of Discrimination 
In the examination of equity in a beleagured marketplace, a 
sufficient theory of discrimination will provide a basis for iden­
tifying existing patterns of discrimination and for determining 
whether the pressures of constricting demand are contributing to 
the perpetuation of the discrimination. Several disciplines have 
made significant contributions to the understanding of the discrim­
inatory process. As the most complete, comprehensive, and rele­
vant theoretical base is found in labor economics, it will be used 
in this study.
Modern labor theory is based on the neoclassical marginal 
productivity theory of wages augmented by assumptions about the 
activity in the marketplace. Discrimination, or as it was formerly 
termed, exploitation, is usually defined as "the payment to labor 
of a wage less than its marginal revenue product (Cartter, 1959, 
p. 65)". This definition states that wages should be a function 
of productivity and net increases in revenue. Since the marginal 
revenue per unit is constant regardless of the identity of the 
worker who produced the unit, the definition reduces to equation 
(1) when viewing the wage differentials between laborers producing 
identical goods.
wi = f p^i^  ^
where w^ = wages of worker i
p^ = productivity level of worker i
12
The demand for labor, as the demand for any productive resource, 
is a function of the marginal revenue product of the worker and the 
wage rate. Assuming a homogeneous marginal wage rate and a homo­
geneous product, the quantity of labor employed is also a function 
of productivity:
QL = s(pL) (2)
where = the quantity of labor employed 
PL = the productivity of labor.
Given the two fundamental relationships cited in equations 
(1) and (2), discrimination can be defined as the violation of one 
or both of the relations to the detriment of one segment of the 
labor force. Madden (1973) provides a detailed analysis of these 
discriminatory acts and includes an additional category in her book 
on The Economics of Sex Discrimination. She cites three types of 
discrimination:
1. Wage discrimination, which occurs when wage differen­
tials are not based on relative productivity differences;
2. Occupational discrimination, which occurs when cri­
teria other than productivity determine the quantity of 
a factor employed in a given occupation;
3. Cumulative discrimination, which occurs when a factor 
has a lower level of productivity due to past discrimi­
nation [p. 2].
The neoclassical definition of discrimination, violation of the
13
relationship cited in equation (1), corresponds to Madden's first 
category, wage discrimination. Her second category is the equiva­
lent of the violation of the accepted definition of demand for 
productive resources shown in equation (2). There is not a theo­
retical equivalent of cumulative discrimination although labor 
economists have recently addressed the problem in terms of parti­
cipation in and barriers to entry into the marketplace.
The identification of wage and occupational discrimination is 
important to this research. An extension of labor theory describ­
ing the market mechanism which matches productivity with employ­
ment opportunities and wages is needed to more fully understand 
the potential for discrimination.
There are three types of economic theories of discrimination. 
The types are based on the subject used to explain apparent imper­
fections in the marketplace: information, taste, and power (Addison 
Siebert, 1979, p. 202). The information-based approach is most 
relevant for this study of the academic marketplace.
The consideration of the role of information in the labor mar­
ket has been refined through the analysis of job market signaling. 
Because employers cannot directly observe future productivity, they 
must use surrogates in the employment decision-making process.
When prospective employees exhibit job-related characteristics, 
they are said to be signaling employers about their future produc­
tivity. Spence C1973) has developed a model of information feedback
14
in the job market.
Insert Figure 1 about here
In his model, prospective employees provide information (signals) 
about themselves. Employers translate these signals into expecta­
tions about the applicants' marginal productivity through the use 
of conditional probabilistic beliefs about the relationship between 
signaling patterns and future productivity. The employer offers 
a wage based on the expected productivity. Applicants choose which 
signals to send based on a desire to maximize the excess of the 
achieved wage rate over the cost of signaling.
Because of the feedback effect embedded in the iterative pro­
cess, employers should receive frequent information on the validity 
of their beliefs about the relationship between a given signal and 
productivity. Spence notes that "the system will be stationary if 
the employer starts out with conditional probabilistic beliefs 
that after one round are not disconfirmed by the incoming data they 
generate [1973, p. 360].
It is the efficiency of this adjustment mechanism which is 
critical to the long-run abolition of discrimination in the market­
place. To the extent that incorrect employer beliefs about the 
relationship between signals and productivity are not corrected by 
experience, invalid beliefs can perpetuate wage and occupational
15
EMPLOYER'S CONDITIONAL 
PROBABILISTIC BELIEFS
SIGNALING COSTS
OFFERED WAGE SCHEDULE AS 
A FUNCTION OF SIGNALS 
AND INDICES
HIRING, OBSERVATION OF 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 
MARGINAL PRODUCT AND 
SIGNALS
SIGNALING DECISIONS BY 
APPLICANTS; MAXIMIZATION 
OF RETURN NET OF SIGNALING 
COSTS
FIGURE 1: INFORMATIONAL FEEDBACK IN THE JOB MARKET 
SOURCE: SPENCE (1973, P. 359)
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discrimination. Several authors have questioned the efficiency of 
this mechanism. Addison and Siebert (1979) note the need for up­
dating information:
Because information about . . . changes is costly to 
obtain, the process of updating will never be complete. 
Consequently, it is quite likely that the empirical 
rules developed will be outdated and that incorrect 
or biased decisions will tend on average to be made.
This tendency will be exaggerated during periods of 
rapid change [p. 208].
The inability of the feedback mechanism to adjust for rapid changes 
in the signal-productivity relationship is exacerbated when the 
change relates to an embedded group. The latter is an identifiable 
group of workers which is not separated from and assumed to be 
homogeneous with another group. In this case, the change in the 
signal-productivity relationship for the embedded group will be 
masked by the constant function relating to the other, and probably 
dominant, group. To the extent that the employers' conditional 
probability distributions are not corrected to reflect the reality 
of the embedded group, discrimination will occur in a form, which, 
given the usually naive "equal treatment" interpretations of the 
term, will be extremely difficult to identify.
Spence's (1973) model utilizes two levels of productivity and 
demonstrates that job-seekers in the low productivity group will
17
utilize a signal that represents low productivity and that job­
seekers in the high-productivity group still utilize a signal that 
represents high productivity. Membership in a particular group 
does not influence signaling behavior. This result relies on 
several assumptions. One is critical to this study. Spence 
assumes that the incidence of signaling costs is the same for all 
groups. This study examines a case in which signaling costs are 
different for each of two groups. Therefore, the results of 
Spence's work relating productivity with signaling behavior do not 
apply.
Assume there are two groups (one and two), and the signaling 
costs are unequal so that the cost of signaling high productivity 
for group one always exceeds that of group two. If workers choose 
signals to mazimize the achieved wage rate net of the costs of sig­
naling, highly productive members of group one will signal low 
productivity as long as the difference between the wages for high 
producers and low producers does not exceed the incremental signal­
ing costs. It will only be worthwhile for a highly productive 
group one job-seeker to signal high productivity if the wage dif­
ferential to be gained exceeds the cost of signaling. Under these 
conditions, the labor market may effectively discriminate against 
group one members if it maintains a signal-productivity relation­
ship that speciously assumes equal signaling costs. Occupational 
and wage discrimination can only be avoided if the market recognizes
18
the true relationship between group one signaling patterns and 
productivity. This result differs from Spence's (197.3) in that it 
assumes that the impact of group membership is felt through dif­
fering signaling costs rather than through the signaling market 
mechanism.
The impact of institutional origin as a job market signal in 
faculty personnel decisions depends on the employing institution's 
expectations about the relationship between inbreeding and pro­
ductivity. The prevalence of prohibitions against the retention, 
promotion, and tenure of inbred individuals reflects the pattern 
of expectations described in equations (3), (4), and (5).
Institutional Origin as a Job Market Signal
E(j>i h ) ■ po
E(Pi|yQ) = p^ with a probability
(3)
(4)
E(Pi|y0) = Pq with a probability 
of 1 ^
(5)
where y^ = inbred signal
Y q  = noninbred signal 
Pq = low productivity 
p^ = high productivity
19
If an applicant is inbred, the employer assumes lower productivity.
Of the noninbred group, employers will assume some proportion (q^ ) 
will have high productivity and the rest will not. Spence's (JL973) 
analysis would dictate that no high producer would choose to send 
the inbred signal. However, when the complication of differential 
signaling costs is introduced, it is clear that a high producer 
will signal inbred as long as the costs of signaling noninbred ex­
ceed the incremental wage to be gained. Spence notes that the 
"signaling costs are to be interpreted broadly to include psychic 
and other costs, as well as the direct monetary ones [1973, p. 359J." 
The constraints on women's location decisions cited previously act 
to increase the cost of signaling outbred. Given this assumption, 
the decision rule cited in equation (3) will discriminate against 
women.
The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship of 
inbreeding to productivity and institutional rewards and to deter­
mine how that relationship varies between men and women. The 
results will provide data for evaluating whether inbreeding pro­
hibitions constitute occupational and wage discrimination against 
women.
Research Hypotheses
The primary goal of the research is to examine the relation­
ship of sex and institutional origin to productivity. Stated more 
formally, this becomes the following hypothesis which will guide
20
this study: Female inbred faculty have patterns of productivity 
which are significantly different from the patterns of productivity 
of male inbred faculty.
The data base and methodology will also allow a reexamination 
and extension of the existing work on the relationships between 
inbreeding and professional and economic advancement. There are 
two additional research hypotheses which reflect these relation­
ships :
inbred faculty show less professional advancement than outbred 
faculty;
inbred faculty receive fewer institutional rewards than out- 
bred faculty.
The balance of this dissertation describes the research under­
taken: the pertinent literature will be reviewed in Chapter 2; the 
methodology discussed in Chapter 3; the results presented in Chap­
ter 4; and the study summarized in Chapter 5.
Chapter 2 
THE LITERATURE
An examination of the literature relevant to the research hypo­
theses cited in Chapter 1 should include surveys of the work on 
inbreeding, productivity, and rewards. In the first section of 
this chapter, the scope and results of previous studies on inbreed­
ing will be examined. The second section reviews the operationali­
zation of productivity in faculty research, with the emphasis placed 
on ways of measuring this concept. Because this research is focused 
on the relation of productivity to inbreeding, no review is made of 
the literature which describes the relation between productivity 
and other variables. In the last section, the literature on both 
reward measures and on methodological approaches for determining 
wage discrimination is reviewed.
Inbreeding
In an examination of the literature on inbreeding, several 
aspects of the studies are of particular importance. First, defi­
nitions of the phenomenon itself are often problematic. Should 
faculty with any degree from their employing institutions be con­
sidered inbred or should this category be limited to those who work 
at the institution which granted their terminal degree? Does it 
matter if an individual has worked at institutions other than his 
or her alma mater?
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Earlier studies use very general criteria for identifying 
inbred faculty (i.e., any degree from the institution at which the 
individual is teaching is sufficient for inbred classification). 
Later studies usually deal with more sophisticated concepts such 
as "silver cording" (Hargens & Farr, 1973) which refers to faculty 
members who have taught for some time at institutions other than 
the ones from which they graduated and then returned to their alma 
mater. The implication of this phenomenon is that the continuing 
connection between the home institution and its graduate is suffi­
ciently strong and positive to draw the faculty member back after 
a "seasoning" period elsewhere. More recent studies reflect the 
increasing importance of terminal degrees as a qualification for 
faculty positions by emphasizing doctoral training in the identi­
fication of inbred subjects.
A second important aspect of inbreeding studies is their 
explicit or implied assumptions about the reasons why institutions 
disfavor, favor, practice, or avoid inbreeding. To the extent that 
these assumptions do not reflect reality or that an institution's 
practices do not match its philosophy, there is a clear need to 
question the difference as it may lead to unfair discrimination 
against some faculty members.
The description of the effects of inbreeding on the individual 
and the institution is a third important aspect. A policy on in- 
breeding which is fair both to the institution and the individuals
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involved can only be the result of an understanding of the real 
effects of the phenomenon. To evaluate the fairness of an institu­
tional policy or practice requires a knowledge of both the relation­
ship between inbreeding and productivity and the stability of that 
relationship across various groups of faculty and through time.
From Eliot's assessment in his 1908 University Administration, 
academic inbreeding has received intermittent treatment in the 
literature on higher education. Many early studies were limited in 
scope to a single institution or a small sample of institutions.
For example, F. W. Reeves examined inbreeding in his study of 
faculty at the University of Chicago in 1933 and J. H. McNeely 
studied faculty inbreeding in land-grant colleges and universities 
(United States Office of Education [USOE], 1932).
In the early 1930s, Walter Crosby Eells and Austin Carl 
Cleveland (1935a, 1935b) undertook a study of the extent, types, 
trends, and effects of inbreeding in a national sample of American 
colleges and universities. Their sample included "all the institu­
tions of higher education on the accredited list of the American 
Council on Education whose catalogues were available in the library 
of Stanford University in 1932 and which contained the necessary 
academic biographies of faculty members [1935a, p. 261]." The sam­
ple included 219 institutions in 42 states.
Eells and Cleveland (1935a) adopted a comprehensive definition 
of inbreeding:
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An individual is considered inbred who is a teaching 
member of the faculty and who has received one or more 
of his earned degrees from the institution in which 
he is giving instruction [p. 262].
The use of any degree as a basis for the inbreeding classification 
expanded the inbred group beyond that usually considered in more 
recent studies, so that Eells and Cleveland's (1935a) overall 
results are not directly comparable to later findings. It is 
possible, however, to use :data they present on the patterns of 
inbreeding according to degree (p. 267) to derive an estimate of 
terminal degree inbreeding by aggregating all categories which 
include doctoral inbreeding. The results of this recomputation are 
shown in Table 1.
Insert Table 1 about here
As Eells and Cleveland (1935a) included instructors in their 
sample, those still working on their degree were included. No 
distinction was made between tenure-track and temporary positions: 
16.1% of the total sample was inbred at the doctoral level. Not 
only is this figure comparable to later results., it is also useful 
in assessing the extent of inbreeding. As Eells and Cleveland 
noted, the total impact of inbreeding was important: "While many 
individual cases may be entirely justifiable, in the long run the
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Table 1
Recomputation of Percentage of Inbred Faculty 
on Eells and Cleveland Data
Total Public Private
Patterns of Inbreeding n=3903
(%)
n=1819
(%)
n=2084
(%)
Bachelor— Master inbreeding—  
Doctorate inbreeding 4.1 2.4 5.6
Bachelor inbreeding— Master 
inbred— Doctorate inbreeding 3.8 3.2 4.4
Bachelor— Master— Doctorate 
inbreeding 3.7 1.8 5.3
Bachelor— No Master— Doctorate 
inbreeding 2.3 .5 3.9
Bachelor inbreeding— No Master—  
Doctorate inbreeding 1.4 .2 2.5
No Bachelor— No Master— Doctorate 
inbreeding .4 .1 .6
Bachelor inbreeding— Master—  
Doctorate inbreeding .2 .1 .3
No Bachelor— Master— Doctorate 
inbreeding .1 .1
No Bachelor— Master— Doctorate 
inbreeding* .1 .1
TOTAL 16.1 8.3 22.8
*From the format of the original table it appears that this line 
should read "No Bachelor— Master inbreeding— Doctorate inbreeding," 
and thus it is not a duplicate of the line above.
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effect of such inbreeding is likely to be distinctly narrowing 
[p. 266]." The authors were justifiably concerned about the effects 
of inbreeding as their analysis using the "any degree" definition 
showed that 34% of the total sample was inbred.
On the topic of why institutions practice inbreeding, Eells 
and Cleveland (1935a) offered a precursor of later work. "Institu­
tions also are inclined to utilize their own graduates in the lower 
academic ranks, in some cases, as a measure of economy [p. 265]."
On the individual's side, the authors observed that graduates may 
seek employment at their own institutions while searching for em­
ployment elsewhere or while working on their doctorates.
In their second article, Eells and Cleveland (1935b) examined 
the effect of inbreeding on rate of advancement, scholarly produc­
tivity, and professional recognition. Each of the 5,707 inbred 
subjects in the study was matched with a noninbred faculty member. 
The matching was based on several characteristics: institutional 
membership, length of service, discipline, sex, and rank. With 
respect to rate of advancement, Eells and Cleveland found that the 
mean years for advancement to the next higher rank was greater for 
inbred groups hired at the instructor (4.3 years vice 3.2 years for 
noninbreds) and assistant professor (4.9 years vice 4.5 years for 
noninbreds) levels. For those hired as associate professors, the 
mean years in rank were virtually the same (4.9 for inbred and 5.0 
for noninbred). It should be noted that Eells and Cleveland do not
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segregate instructors hired while still completing degree require­
ments. Thus, it is possible that the large discrepancy in mean 
time to promotion from the instructor level is determined at least 
in part by the tendency to hire an institution's own students be­
fore they receive their degrees.
Eells and Cleveland (1935b) measured scholarly productivity 
by the number of books published and by the total number of publi­
cations. Data was obtained for a paired sample by searching the 
United States Catalogue. Of the inbred group, 15.8% had published 
at least one book while 21% of the noninbred group were authors. 
While 322 inbred authors produced 864 books (2.68 books per author), 
428 noninbred authors write 1,122 (2.64 books per author). Based 
on the lower percentage of inbred authors and the fewer total books 
produced by them, Eells and Cleveland concluded that there "is a 
distinct evidence in favor of the noninbred group [p. 326]." They 
do not seem to consider that on the average, noninbred authors were 
no more productive than inbred ones and that the option to publish 
may or may not have been equally available across the whole sample. 
For example, inbreds hired as instructors who have not finished 
their degree, are unlikely to publish while noninbreds hired with 
terminal degrees may be more likely to publish. Although Eells and 
Cleveland believed this evidence favored noninbreds, it may in fact 
only have reflected the conditions under which they were hired.
To assess a broader measure of scholarly productivity, Eells
28
and Cleveland (1935b) studied all publications for 992 subjects at 
4 institutions. Data collected from "official reports of faculty 
publications" revealed that 227 inbred authors produced an average 
of 6.03 titles per author and 231 noninbred authors produced 6.72 
titles per author. Although Eells and Cleveland concluded that 
these results "are unfavorable to the inbred group [p. 327]," the 
significance of the difference is questionable, especially in light 
of the fact that "less than half of the faculty in either group 
published anything during the three-year period under consideration 
[p. 328]."
As a measure of professional recognition, Eells and Cleveland 
(1935b) used the percentage of inbred and noninbred subjects which 
were included in each of three national reference works. The data 
for Who's Who in America was characteristic of that for all three 
works: 7.1% of the inbred subjects were included, while 10.5% of 
the noninbreds were included. Across all three works, the nonin­
bred subjects were more likely to be mentioned.
Eells and Cleveland (1935b) reviewed the work in their two 
articles with a clear condemnation of the effects on individuals 
of institutional inbreeding.
From every standpoint from which objective evidence has 
been collected it appears that the probability of academic 
advancement, scholarly productivity, and outside profes­
sional recognition are distinctly greater for men who
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have had their academic preparation in institutions 
other than those in which they are teaching [p. 328].
In 1938, A. B. Hollingshead published an article on the 
relation between ingroup membership and academic selection at 
Indiana University. One of his three criteria for ingroup member­
ship was "academic training leading to the successful completion 
of one of more degrees at Indiana University [p.826]." Hollings­
head studied 802 regular appointments made from 1885 to 1937. He 
found such a "prevalence of alumni in administrative office" that 
he concluded "that the destiny of the university . . . had been 
centered in the hands of alumni [p. 827]." Other results were the 
identification of an inverse relation between academic rank and 
alumni appointments and the discovery that more than one half of 
the instructors were inbred. Hollingshead cited three reasons for 
the high rate of selection from within:
First, the administrators were usually egocentric, 
prizing their own viewpoints above all others; second, 
they are personally familiar with the [inbred] men 
and know whether they are "sympathetic" and "reasona­
ble"; third, it is easier to engage a person who is 
on the ground or readily contacted than to spend time, 
money, and energy looking for outside personnel. Pride 
in your institution, familiarity with the men you have 
trained, and their more general docility, are apparently
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some of the factors that tend to "Inbreeding 
[p. 832]."
McGee (I960 ) argued that inbreeding, although "deplored," 
was practical as a "functional necessity" to allow an institution 
to compete in the national labor market even though "it is handi­
capped by location and inadequate finances [p. 483]." In order 
to attract well-known scholars to a relatively isloated location, 
the institution must pay them a premium. Given this burden on 
the finite operating budget, however,: the university must find 
other faculty willing to work at a discount. McGee argued that it 
is the inbred faculty who were "robbed" in order to attract gradu­
ates from other major universities. By discriminating against the 
inbred faculty on those variables over which the university has 
control, the efforts of and rewards to inbred faculty were manipu­
lated to allow a surplus of rewards and a decrease in work load 
for noninbred faculty.
Using the faculty of the University of Texas as a single case 
study, McGee (1960 ) examined 9 job factors across inbred and non­
inbred faculty. He defined inbred faculty as those which received 
their highest degree from the University of Texas. Of the 9 job 
factors, 4 were classified as "Category I: Totally Controlled by 
the University": present rank, rank at first appointment, years 
served in junior rank, and annual class load. Professional pro­
ductivity and possession of research grants were included in
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"Category II: Partially Controlled by University." The last 
three job factors: membership in learned societies, office in 
learned societies, and listing in national reference works, com­
prised the third category, "Not Controlled by University." McGee 
compared the inbred and noninbred groups by defining two levels 
of performance for each job factor (e.g., "1-6" and "7 and over" 
for annual class load) and by determining the percentage of inbreds
and noninbreds which fit each of the levels. The percentages were
then compared by a Chi-square test.
In Category I, all the observed differences were statistically 
significant at the .05 (or higher) level. As McGee (1960 ) ob­
served, an inbred faculty member
is less likely to be an assistant professor at the 
present time, is much less likely to have received 
his first appointment at that rank even if he now
holds it, is more likely to serve longer in the
junior ranks before promotion or departure and is 
more likely to have a higher teaching load [p. 486].
Noninbred faculty were more likely to be classed as produc­
tive <  .05), where productivity was defined as "any publication 
or presentation directed to a professional audience, and including 
pieces of individual creativity in the graphic arts as well as 
literary, musical, and dramatic works [p. 487]." Of the inbred 
faculty, 53% were classed as productive while 70% of the noninbred
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faculty had achieved the same status. The other partially con­
trolled variable, possession of research grants, required some 
modification. In a later reference to this article, McGee (1961) 
admitted that the data was "flatly incorrect in the original table 
[p. 58]." It is possible to reconstruct what should have appeared 
in the original table from the data presented in different form 
in the second article. The corrected results for possession of 
research grants are shown in Table 2. The analysis of McGee's 
corrected data presented in this table shows that inbred faculty
Insert Table 2 about here
were significantly less likely to have received grant support.
Results for 2 of the 3 "Not Controlled by University" vari­
ables, membership in learned societies and listing in national 
reference works, were not statistically significant at the .05 
level. Only the "office in learned societies" variable showed 
significant results. Inbred faculty were more likely to have held 
an office (j) _< .01) .
McGee (1960 .) also presented data on production of books, 
articles, reviews and other publications by University of Texas 
graduates, graduates of other major institutions, and graduates of 
minor institutions. Here again the data was presented as percen­
tages of the inbred or outbred groups which have published at
Table 2
Reconstruction of McGee's (1961) Results 
on Possession of Research Grants
Source of highest academic
_________ degree________
Texas Other Chi
Institution Square
Possession of research grants
Grants 38 153
No grants 66 90
TOTAL 104 243
20.55
p < .01
Note. From "Texas Institutional Inbreeding Re-examined" by 
Reece McGee, American Journal of Sociology, 196J-, 67, 58-60.
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least one item in the category in question. McGee concluded that 
his data showed that in every case but that of reviews, Universi­
ty of Texas Ph.D.s had produced more scholarly works than men with 
doctoral degrees from other institutions (p. 488). Actually, the 
data he presented does not support the contention about the aggre­
gate number of scholarly works, however, it did indicate that for 
every category except the review, inbred faculty were more likely 
to have published at least one example.
McGee's (1960 ) hypothesis was that "the University of Texas, 
in order to compete to the maximum possible degree in the academic 
labor market of the other major universities, has appointed large 
numbers of its own graduates to the junior faculty [p. 486]." He 
believed that his results showed that there was discrimination 
against inbred faculty and that "there was no reason to believe 
that the differential treatment of the inbred product is the result 
of inferior quality on his part Ip. 488]." However, he also thought 
that the results were not the result of a conscious plan.
All this is not to suggest that the administrators of 
the university have together compounded a policy for 
inbreeding; rather it seems more likely that the uni­
versity's handicaps in the academic labor market have 
caused numerous deans and department chairmen and mem­
bers of promotion committees individually to decide to 
rob Peter to pay Paul in specific cases and have created,
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thus, an unconsciously developed administrative adjus- 
ment resulting in selective, discriminatory inbreeding 
[p. 488].
Gold and Lieberson (1961) use the analysis in McGee's (1960 ) 
study to demonstrate the need for multivariate analysis "when the 
investigator is interested in describing a phenomenon of some com­
plexity, not observed directly but inferred from the observation 
of associations taken to be consequences of the phenomenon 
[p. 506]." As an example, the authors cite the analysis of rank: 
McGee observes directly that a greater proportion of 
noninbred than of inbred junior members of the faculty 
are assistant professors. This association between 
source of highest degree (major academic training) 
and rank exists at the University of Texas; the ob­
served association cannot be questioned as a descrip­
tion . . . [But] the inference of discrimination must 
imply that other variables cannot explain or change 
the nature of the association [p. 507].
By enlarging McGee's (1960 ) analysis of rank to include possession 
of a doctorate, Gold and Lieberson deduced that the proportion of 
non-Ph.D.s was considerably larger among the inbred assistant pro­
fessors. They concluded that "the data clearly suggests a bias in 
favor of local products {p. 508]."
Gold and Lieberson (1961) also combined productivity, posses-
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sion of a doctorate, rank, and source of degree in a secondary 
analysis which showed that "33% of the Texans (those with Ph.D.s 
from Texas) with some claim to higher rank must be instructors 
[p. 508]," while 37% of the non-Texans fell in the same category.
The proportions of both groups which did not meet one or both of 
the criteria, but had been promoted to assistant professor are 
virtually the same (23% for Texans, 24% for non-Texans).
Gold and Lieberson's (1961) secondary analysis did cast uncer­
tainty on the original conclusions, but McGee (I960 ) replied with 
a further analysis of the original data which added degree to 
source of highest degree and job factor. Of the variables con­
trolled by the university, inbred faculty were favored only among 
Ph.D. holders with respect to present rank. Inbred and outbred, 
non-Ph.D. faculty had the same class loads. For all other job 
factor and degree combinations, the outsiders were favored. Again, 
all the statistics were in percentages and no tests of significance 
were made. On 8 of the remaining 10 job factor-degree combinations, 
Texans were more productive. Outsiders had a higher percentage of 
productive people only in professional productivity by non-Ph.D. 
holders. McGee concluded that "even when the doctorate is con­
sidered, the inbred are still discriminated against despite some 
evidence that they may be of higher quality than 'outsiders1 
[p. 58]."
The final conclusions to be drawn from the primary and secon-
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dary analyses of the McGee (1960 ) data are not clear. Gold and 
Lieberson (1961) were correct in their statement that the analysis 
must take into account significant competing hypotheses and vari­
ables, yet McGee's findings are suggestive. It is also important 
to note that all of the work was based on arbitrary determinations 
of categories for each variable. None of the analyses used a con­
tinuous scale for professional activity, productivity, class load, 
or offices in learned societies. All of the analyses were depen­
dent on the arbitrary cutoff points chosen to dichotomize vari­
ables which would be better treated as continuous scales. Because 
the data was from only one university, which McGee admits is dif­
ferent in significant ways from other major universities, the ex­
ternal validity of any results must be seriously questioned.
Hargens and Farr (1973) used data collected by Warren 0. 
Hagstrom in 1966 to examine inbreeding. Educational, occupational, 
and citation histories were collected for 1,514 graduate faculty 
members in the fields of mathematics, experimental biology, physics, 
and chemistry. Hargens and Farr examined two questions:
First . . . the relationships between academic inbreeding 
and measures of scholarly performance after controlling 
for other variables such as the prestige of a scientist's 
present departmental affiliation. Second . . . the inde­
pendent relationship between academic inbreeding and a 
measure of institutional reward, the number of years
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which elapsed between a scientist's appointment to his 
first position and his first subsequent promotion {p. 1387J. 
Although Hargens and Farr found a negative relationship between 
inbreeding and both number of articles published and number of 
citations to previously published works, the coefficients were not 
large enough to be significant. The authors concluded that there 
is "no evidence . . .  to suggest that academic inbreeding has any 
particular independent relationahip with scientific productivity 
when departmental prestige and year of Ph.D. are included in the 
analysis {p. 1389]."
Hargens and Farr (1973) continued their analysis by examining 
the effect of inbreeding on quantity of publications and citations 
for scientists in their first position at "distinguished" depart­
ments and for scientists in their second and succeeding appoint­
ments across all institutions and for distinguished departments 
only. Hargens and Farr concluded that
When we control for professional experience, scientists 
with positions at their doctoral departments tend to be 
slightly less productive, in terms of quantity and quality 
of publications, than their noninbred colleagues. Although 
these differences are fairly small and most often statis­
tically insignificant, it is notable that every one of the 
12 regression coefficients indicating a comparison of 
inbreed with non-inbred scientists shows a negative sign.
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On the basis of this evidence it is not unreasonable to 
suggest that a slight negative relationship between in- 
breeding and professional output does exist, but that the 
relationship, independent of other variables, is so small 
that in a given instance only very large samples enable us 
to reject the null hypothesis that its manifestation in 
that instance is attributable to sampling error [p. 1393].
Most existing studies of inbreeding suffer from one or both 
of two significant weaknesses. Many studies have sampling restric­
tions based on institution or discipline with a consequent con­
striction of generalizability. There is also, as Gold and Lieber­
son (1961) noted, a need for the use of multivariate analyses to 
limit the number of untested competing hypotheses. The examination 
of inbreeding as a basis for discrimination must use a data base 
of sufficient size and diversity to allow generalization and the 
most sophisticated techniques of analysis the data will support.
In summary, the research on inbreeding is unified only in its 
assumption of the undesirability of the phenomenon. The pessimism 
reflected in Eliot's (1908) statement at the turn of the century 
prevades the literature. Although there are some indications in 
the research that inbreeding is related to lower productivity, the 
range of results and the methodological problems which haunt stud­
ies in this area hinder the development of a strong conclusion.
With respect to the research hypotheses stated in Chapter 1, it is
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important to note that none of the research reviewed in this chap­
ter includes any consideration of sex. As it is likely that the 
samples studied were primarily or completely male, there is no 
basis for inference about the characteristics of female inbred 
faculty at colleges and universities.
Productivity
Research Productivity
To evaluate the degree of similarity between two groups or 
the possible existence of discrimination between the groups, the 
researcher must be able to describe the members of the groups in 
terms of characteristics which are relevant to the research ques­
tion. Much of the research using descriptions of the professoriate 
has been done by sociologists and economists. The former often 
work on the sociology of science or information dissemination (e.g., 
Cole & Cole, 1967; Crane, 1970; Long, 1978) and the latter most 
frequently examine the reward structure in academia (e.g., Hoffman, 
1976; Reagan, 1975).
As the studies of inbreeding demonstrate, an important factor 
in any economic analysis is productivity. Statements about the 
fairness of selection procedures and rewards must be tempered by 
an acknowledgement of the relative productivity of those being com­
pared. Measures of academic productivity are routinely limited to 
research results only. Definitions of productivity in the litera­
ture assume a basic, common teaching load that does not vary sig-
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nificantly; as a consequence, research results are considered to 
be the only real and variable result of the academic production 
function. The basic measures of productivity used in the litera­
ture will be examined in this section.
Perhaps the most frequently used measure of productivity is 
the number of journal articles a faculty member has published 
(e.g., Cole & Cole, 1967; Crane, 1970; Hagstrom, 1971; Long, 1978). 
Theoretically, this measure is favored because of the importance 
of journal articles in the information dissemination process and 
because of the emphasis on reporting research results. The latter 
emphasis assumes journal articles are a good surrogate for re­
search work. Operationally, the number of journal articles pub­
lished is both verifiable and objective. University publication 
lists, abstract services, and bibliographical listings all provide 
reasonable sources for measuring the journal article productivity 
of a faculty member. Because the universe of journals can be 
defined and because authorship is rarely in question, there is 
little argument about the determination of the articles to be 
attributed to a particular author.
Although journal articles are the most frequently used measure 
of productivity, the number of books and monographs is also used, 
sometimes separately and sometimes combined with journal produc­
tivity (Katz, 1973; Tuckman, Gapinski, & Hagemann, 1977). Although 
the count of longer publications is as objective and verifiable as
42
the number of journal articles, books and monographs require a 
different type of effort. Books often do not stress research 
results but are rather a reflection of general scholarly effort. 
Fields which emphasize research results rely more heavily on jour­
nal articles (e.g., the hard sciences). Since much of the early 
work on academic productivity has been centered on the sciences 
(Cole & Cole, 1967; Hagstrom, 1971), book and monograph produc­
tion have received little emphasis as productivity variables. In 
nonscientific fields, book publication may in fact have a much 
stronger relation to research.
Because of the difference in the type and quantity of work 
required to produce articles and books, it would seem best to keep 
their numbers separate. They are not additive without some equiva­
lence function and a universal one has not been developed. For a 
discussion of one combination strategy, see Brittingham, Pezzullo, 
Ramsay, Long and Ageloff (Pezzullo & Brittingham, 1979, p. 106).
Beyond a reliance on editors and publishers, simple counts 
of articles and books can address only the quantity of an author's 
work and not the quality. Several researchers (Chubin, 1973; Cole 
& Cole, 1967) have examined the use of citation indices as a mecha­
nism for measuring the quality of research. The results of their 
work indicate that citations were related to other measures of 
quality. For example, Cole & Cole (1967) found that the variable 
most highly correlated with peer ranking of significant contribu­
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tions in psychology was the number of scientific journal citations 
to the author's work (p. 379). In another paper (1972), Cole & 
Cole found that Nobel laureates averaged over ten times as many 
citations as other scientists. Chubin (1973) noted that although 
"more than half of each cohort published at least one article or 
book, . . . only a third garnered one or more citations [p. 188]."
There are several problems with using citations as measures 
of academic productivity. From a procedural standpoint, citation 
listings do not cover all academic fields. Indices for the 
sciences are well-designed, while in other fields their develop­
ment is more recent or nonexistent. A potential bias against the 
productivity of junior authors is found in the practice of listing 
only the first author of co-authored papers. There are, however, 
indications that this bias is not severe. Chubin (1973) found a 
correlation coefficient of .97 between the total citations and 
citations to single-authored works of scientists using the Science 
Citation Index (p. 189).
Some productivity studies work with data from abstracts or 
bibliographical works (Cole & Cole, 1973; Crane, 1970). An alter­
native source is the faculty members themselves (Allison & Stewart, 
1974; Astin & Bayer, 1975; Hagstrom, 1971). However, few studies 
use self-report measures because of the relative difficulty in 
surveying a significant number of subjects. Self-report measures 
also may be suspect because of possible respondent bias. However,
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Allison and Stewart (1974) found a correlation of .94 between self- 
reported number of publications and results from a survey of ab­
stracts. Their results indicate that respondent bias was not a 
significant problem in requests for publication data.
Prestige
Although the importance of research productivity in the 
description of the academic effort cannot be contested (long, 1979; 
p. 147), other factors are also important (Long, 1979; Pezzullo & 
Brittingham, 1979). Complementary to the use of research produc­
tivity is the inclusion of prestige, which Caplow and McGee (1958) 
describe as "not a direct measure of productivity but a composite 
of subjective opinion [p. 110]." They further explain that it con­
sists "in essence, of what other people think about a man [p. 104]."
The clearest, externally-grounded measures of prestige are 
departmental affiliations. It is unclear whether the subjective 
opinions of a person held by peers are the result of or the cause 
of departmental placements. Regardless of the direction of causal­
ity, the relationship is clear.
Departmental affiliation need not be current; it may be a past 
location, a current affiliation, or an expected location. Long 
(1978) used selectivity of a subject’s baccalaureate institution 
as a variable in his study of prestige and productivity among 
scientists. He noted that this variable, which "has been interpre­
ted . . .  as a measure of the quality of baccalaureate education,
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has been shown to be a moderately successful predictor of future 
success [p. 893]." Long also used prestige rankings for the scien­
tist's doctoral or postdoctoral institution. Crane (1970) used 
prestige rankings for graduate schools and hiring departments in 
a study of the academic marketplace. She found that "the prestige 
of doctorate has more influence than scholarly performance upon 
selection for a position in a leading academic department [p. 961]." 
Caplow and McGee (1958) lamented the critical nature of the doctoral 
department: "Unfortunately, as we have seen, the initial choice of 
a graduate school sets an indelible mark on the student's career 
[p. 193]."
In the area of prestige accruing from doctoral affiliation, 
inbred faculty are in a peculiar position. Since the prestige of 
their doctoral program and of their current department are the 
same, it is unlikely that prestige resulting from the doctoral 
institution is a critical positive variable in the hiring process 
unless the department is unable to attract any candidates from 
other departments with equal or higher prestige.
Departmental affiliations need not be for training in order 
to confer prestige. The ranking of the department in which a 
faculty member holds a position also influences the subjective 
evaluation of that individual's performance. Caplow and McGee 
(1958) discussed the effects of employment prestige and its re­
sults:
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The higher the rank of the department . . . the
more it serves its individual members by confer­
ring a derivative reputation on them. This repu­
tation tends to make them more desirable to other 
universities, more independent of their own, and 
more inclined to mobility [p. 91].
An important factor in this observation is the linkage between 
prestige and mobility. It would seem that the greater an indi­
vidual's prestige, whether derived from identification with his 
employing department or from other sources, the greater the indi­
vidual's marketability. The higher an individual's prestige, the 
more likely the person has received offers for employment by other
institutions, especially if the individual has make known a willing­
ness to consider other offers.
Prestige can also be measured by honorary degrees, awards, 
and memberships or fellowships in honorary societies. Although 
these awards are often viewed as rewards for prior research accom­
plishments (Cole & Cole, 1967), they generally confer an increase 
in prestige on the recipient.
Other Descriptive Variables
The preceding sections on productivity and prestige measures 
reflect the biases of much of the sociological research on faculty. 
As the introduction to productivity variables notes, the modal view 
of the output of academic work is pecularily limited to published
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scholarly research. There are also several descriptive variables 
of Interest which have not often appeared in sociological studies, 
but which are essential for the evaluation of reward systems. 
Additional output measures and other individual descriptive vari­
ables will be discussed in this section.
The research-based conceptualization of academic productivity 
assumes either that all teaching requirements are equivalent and 
therefore need not be considered or that teaching is optional and 
that professors first allocate whatever time they choose to re­
search and all other university obligations compete for whatever 
is left. Researchers often choose to ignore or minimize any stated 
goal of an institution other than research. That teaching and ser­
vice may also have legitimate cliams to a faculty member's time is 
a reality too easily avoided. However, it need not be. The quan­
titative aspects of teaching demands can be measured by number of 
contact hours per week, or perhaps more accurately, by number of 
student credit hours (i.e., of credit hours per course x number 
of students in class). If data were available from an acceptable 
instrument, teaching expertise could be included as a qualitative 
measure of pedagogical efforts (Doyle, 1979; Martin & Williams, 
1979).
Service, in the traditional sense of community outreach activi­
ties could also be measured in terms of contact hours. An average 
measure over a long period of time would smooth out fluctuations
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caused by the usually intermittent nature of these activities.
A recent development in the area of outreach by universities is 
the expansion of paid consulting services. In those areas of the 
curriculum where academician's skills are in demand in the market­
place, income from noninstitutional sources is a surrogate for ser­
vice activity.
Administrative activity is also ignored in classical produc­
tivity measures. Efforts in departmental or institutional gover­
nance could be measured in terms of the number of administrative 
assignments or hours devoted to them. For example, Tuckman (1979) 
asked respondents to identify their major work activity as adminis­
tration, teaching or research. She also asked whether respondents 
had any prior administrative experience.
A final omission in the routine operationalization of produc­
tivity is "grantsmanship." For some faculty and institutions, the 
ability to capture external support is critical. Beyond benefits 
in terms of release time or support for the individual faculty mem­
ber, grants provide much needed financial support for the institu­
tion through overhead assessments. Although the works supported 
by the grant may result in publications, and therefore be reflected 
in classic productivity measures, the extra effort and benefit from 
outside support will not be properly disclosed. One measure for 
"grantsmanship" is the dollars of support received. An alternative 
is the number of proposals authored (Brittingham, Pezzullo, Ramsay,
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Long & Ageloff, 1979).
Although most sociological studies do not Include much data 
about the individual subjects themselves, demographic data is of­
ten used in economic studies, especially those on discrimination. 
Race, sex, and, more recently, age are most often used to stratify 
examples, while discipline and experience are included as indepen­
dent variables. Only experience presents any measurement difficul­
ties. Chronological age may be used as a surrogate for experi­
ence, assuming that the difference between starting times among 
individuals is insignificant. Other researchers (Tuckman, Gapin- 
ski & Hagemann, 1977) computed a more exact years of experience 
by subtracting the year of Ph.D. receipt from the year of study. 
Ramsay (1979) noted that years since terminal degree or age are 
correlated, but not perfectly, with experience (p. 41). The first, 
he argued, is a minimum measure as it is likely that an individual's 
experience began before the post-doctoral period.
Rewards
Researchers have taken many different views of the rewards to 
work as a faculty member. From sources external from the institu­
tion, a faculty member may receive honorary degrees, awards, and 
invitations to membership in select societies (Cole & Cole, 1967; 
Crane, 1979). The disciplinary community as a whole also provides 
recognition through attention to research, most commonly manifested 
in citations. Cole & Cole (1967) made note of Waterman's view that
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citations operate "as a greater incentive for scientists than more 
formal recognition, like prizes and awards [p. 384]."
Although external rewards are by no means trivial, especially 
to faculty who prize their mobility, the primary focus of this 
research will be on rewards dispensed within the institution. It 
is the university that exercises the decision to hire the inbred 
scholar and that is most likely to be sensitive to inbred status.
Within the institution, rewards may come in many forms. Tri- 
vett (1978) found that
Compensation is an inclusive term that could embrace all 
forms of economic and noneconomic rewards a person might 
receive for higher education. Psychic gratification from 
relatively high social and professional status and the 
challenge of teaching are types of compensation for work 
in higher education [p. 1],
The report went on to draw on work by Furniss for an enumeration 
of examples of compensation
Compensation also includes such benefits as office space, 
faculty club memberships, perhaps a parking place, and 
particularly for faculty members, the opportunity to earn 
additional income by applying knowledge outside the 
institution [p. 1].
These noneconomic rewards, especially the last one, are by no 
means trivial. But, due to the difficulty of estimating dollar
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equivalents, the emphasis in this research will be on salaries. 
Direct cash payments for services rendered to the university are 
the most objective, verifiable measure of reward.
Much has been written on salaries in higher education. Of 
interest to the research questions in this study is the development 
of a methodology for identifying wage discrimination. As a result 
of the inclusion of academic employees under the Civil Rights Act 
(1964) through the Education Amendments of 1972, there has been 
much concern about the identification, measurement, and abolition 
of wage discrimination in higher education. Nevill (1975) and 
Pezzullo and Brittingham (1979) provided a summary of methods to 
compare salaries for different groups. These studies, like most 
others on wage discrimination in higher education, focused on the 
problem of discrimination against women, but the methodologies dis­
cussed could be applied to any affinity group. Nevill noted that 
the traditional procedure is to compute and compare averages for 
various groups. This method ignores any within group variance in 
important variables and therefore does not yield results which can 
be strictly interpreted as measures of discrimination. Morse (1979) 
demonstrated that the comparison of means may be misleading. In 
his simulation, means for an unbiased school appeared unfair, while 
the same data for a biased institution appeared fair.
There are two other methods which allow the variance on a num­
ber of significant variables to be included in the computation:
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pairing (also referred to as counterparting) and multiple regres­
sion models. The former requires that each member of the subject 
group be paired with a member of the "favored" group who has the 
closest similar qualifications. Ideally, the match in characteris­
tics should be so close that any discrepancy in salary could be 
attributable to group membership and, therefore, to wage discrimi­
nation. It is, however, very difficult, especially given the many 
relevant characteristics and the small size of most faculties, to 
accurately match professors with any reliability (Pezzullo & 
Brittingham, 1979, p. 4). Across institutions, paring is almost 
impossible to operationalize because of the difficulty of deter­
mining the effect of institution on individual salaries.
The most powerful and frequently used technique to identify 
wage discrimination is multiple regression analysis. Whether exami­
ning the existence of discrimination (Ramsay, 1979; Scott, 1977; 
Tuckman, 1979) or the rewards of faculty skills (e.g., Tuckman, 
Gapinski, & Hagemann, 1977), multiple regression analysis is usu­
ally the technique of choice because of its capacity to include the 
variance from many characteristics through their inclusion as inde­
pendent variables. Katz (1973), Tuckman, Gapinski and Hagemann 
(1977), and Tuckman and Tuckman (1976) used multiple regression 
analysis to examine the rewards for various faculty skills. Bayer 
and Austin (1975), Hoffman (1976), Johnson and Stafford (1974), 
and Scott (1977) used multiple regression analysis to assess the
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existence of wage discrimination in faculty salaries.
To determine discrimination, a regression equation estimating 
salary in terms of selected characteristics is developed for the 
favored group. This equation is then used with the characteris­
tics of the subject group to develop an estimate of each indi­
vidual’s salary as if that person belonged to the favored group. 
Assuming the independent variables reflect the basis for legiti­
mate salary determination, any discrepancy must be due to group 
membership. A careful explication of this technique is presented 
in Ramsay (1979) and Scott (1977).
One difficulty in implementing this methodology is the choice 
of predictor variables (Ramsay, 1979; Scott, 1977). Ramsay cau­
tioned against ad hoc modeling with cross-sectional data and de­
scribes four possible sources of difficulty: multicollinearity, 
proxy variables, specification error, and simultaneous equation 
bias. Scott compared the predictive ability of the several sets 
of independent variables shown in Figure 2.
Insert Figure 2 about here
We conclude from the pilot study that there is little 
gain in reliability of the estimated salaries of 
white males with a large number of predictor variables,
Models 1 2 3 4 5
Variables
Year of Birth X X X X X
Year of Doctorate X X X X X
Number-of Papers X X X X
Number of Books X X X X
Date Hired X X X
Number of Ph.D.s X X X
Year of Doctorate (squared) X X
Number of papers (squared) X
Number of Ph.D.s (squared) X
Figure 2. Variables included in Scott’s (n.d.) models
Note. Scott, Elizabeth L. Higher education salary evaluation 
(Washington, D.C.: American Association of University Professors).
55
and there may even be some loss considering the 
additional costs involved in obtaining the 
additional data; reliability does not justify re­
quiring that many predictor variables be used.
However, it may be that more consistent estimates 
of salary inequities are obtained when more pre­
dictor variables are used in the salary estimates 
[1977, p. 15].
The use of regression analysis to examine salary equity is an 
accepted practice. The modeling process can also be used to test 
existing differentials for significance of relationships.
Summary
The literature evaluating the relative merits of inbred faculty 
is ambiguous. Eells and Cleveland (1935a & 1935b) argued that 
while the hiring of inbreds may be "distinctly narrowing," it is 
often undertaken as a "measure of economy." Although they con­
cluded that noninbreds are more productive, the lack of an exami­
nation of confounding factors renders their conclusions suspect.
While Hollingshead (1938) cited pride, familiarity and docil­
ity as reasons for inbreeding at Indiana University, McGee (1960 ) 
argued that inbreeding at the University of Texas was a "func­
tional necessity" to allow the University to compete in the labor 
market (p. 483). McGee's analysis of various job factors over 
inbred and noninbred faculty indicated that the former do not
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represent "inferior quality {p. 488J." Gold and Lieberson (1961). 
used McGee’s study to demonstrate the need for multivariate analy­
sis by adding possession of a doctorate in a secondary analysis. 
They concluded that Texas favored inbred faculty. McGee's (1961 ) 
reply included source as well as possession of terminal degree. 
Based on this second expansion of the original work, McGee again 
concluded that inbreds were subject to discrimination.
Hargens and Farr (1973) found inbred scientists to be slightly 
less productive than noninbred ones. The coefficient for inbred 
faculty productivity in their results was uniformly negative, but 
often insignificant. The pessimistic ambiguity of the Hargens 
and Farr results is characteristic of the research on inbreeding. 
The literature is unified only in its assumption of the undesira­
bility of the phenomenon. The studies, often restricted by metho­
dological simplicity, do not present a clear statement on either 
the relative merits of inbred faculty or on the individual or in­
stitutional motivations to practice inbreeding.
The early and still dominant definition of productivity for 
faculty is based on research productivity. The emphasis on publi­
cation of journal articles and books, and on citations to previous 
works reflects the frequent focus on faculty from scientific dis­
ciplines where such data is both available and reliable. A deriva­
tive definition of research productivity can be found in the 
opinions of a faculty member's peers (Caplow & McGee, 1958).
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The inclusion of teaching and service as well as research in 
the definition of productivity is desirable (Long, 1979). Adminis­
trative activity is also important, especially in the analysis of 
salaries as prior or current administrative service was found to 
have a positive impact on compensation (Tuckman, 1979). Measure­
ment techniques in these areas are not as well-developed as those 
in research productivity.
Rewards to academic productivity may take many forms (Trivett, 
1978). The focus of this research was on institutional salary as 
a measure of reward. The pattern of rewards will be evaluated 
through the use of multiple-regression analysis (Ramsay, 1979; 
Scott, 1977).
Chapter 2 has surveyed the literature on inbreeding, academic 
productivity, and rewards. Chapter 3 describes the methodology for 
a study extending the research on inbreeding to cover differences 
between male and female inbred faculty. The description of the 
individual subjects for the determination of the differences was 
based on many of the variables described in this chapter. Multi­
ple regression analysis was used to identify and test for discrimi­
nation in compensation.
Chapter 3 
THE METHODOLOGY
The objective of this study was to build on existing research 
by expanding on the studies presented in Chapter 2. The 1977 sur­
vey of the American Professoriate was selected as the data base 
because it provided the most recent and comprehensive data on 
college and university faculty. The Survey is described in the 
first and second sections of this chapter, with the first section 
focused on the sampling procedure and the second section concerned 
with the questionnaire. (The text of individual questionnaire 
items is reproduced in Appendix A.) There are seven statistical 
hypotheses, derived from the three research hypotheses presented 
in Chapter 1, which are presented and explained in the third sec­
tion of the chapter. Analyses used to test the statistical hypo­
theses are described in the fourth section.
The Sample
The data for this research was taken from the 1977 Survey of 
the American Professoriate. This instrument was designed and 
implemented under the direction of Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. and 
Seymour Martin Lipset and is described in detail in MacDonald 
(Note 2). Questionnaire development and data management were 
handled by the staff of the Social Science Data Center of the 
University of Connecticut.
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The Survey was chosen as an appropriate sample for this 
research because of its breadth. As noted in Chapter 2, most 
studies of inbreeding are limited to a single institution or a 
narrow range of disciplines. The 1977 Survey encompasses 160 
institutions and includes faculty from virtually all major academic 
disciplines. The breadth of the data base allows a level of gene­
ralization which has not been approached in inbreeding research 
since the Eells and Cleveland (1935a, 1935b) studies.
The 1977 Survey is based on a sampling process which began 
with the random selection of the institutions within a quota sys­
tem based on the classification of the Carnegie Council on Policy 
Studies in Higher Education. Within each chosen institution, a 
predefined proportion of full-time faculty were chosen as a pool 
for the final sampling process. These proportions were adjusted 
to compensate for the over-sampling from the doctoral-granting 
category at the institutional level. Of the individuals in the 
pool, 33.7% were chosen randomly for the core sample. The develop­
ment of the core sample through the sampling scheme is shown in 
Table 3.
Insert Table 3 about here
Of the 8,967 questionnaires mailed out, 4,607 were returned.
Of the 4,607 returned 224 were unusable because of irregularities 
in the manner in which they were filled out or because the respon-
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Table 3 
Sampling Scheme
Tier
level
Carnegie
classification
Schools 
Number P.ercent
Proportions 
of faculty 
chosen
: Core 
sample 
pool
Core
sample
1. Doctoral-Granting
Institutions 80 50 1/6 13,404 4,512
II. Comprehensive 
Universities and 
Colleges 40 25 1/6 2,262 762
III. Liberal Arts 
Colleges I 13 8 1/3 519 175
IV. Liberal Arts 
Colleges II 6 4 1/3 139 47
V. 2-Year Colleges 21 13 1/4 898 303
Total 160 100 17,221 5,799
Note. From Technical Report; 1977 Survey of the American Profes­
soriate by R. K. MacDonald. Storrs: The University of Connecticut, 
Social Sciences Data Center, February, 1978, p. 2.
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dent was ineligible for the study. MacDonald (Note 2, p. 7) com­
puted the "actual, adjusted response rate" as 51.7% (4,383 usable 
responsed divided by 8,473). This is "the proportion of the facul­
ty eligible and able to participate in our study who chose to re­
turn a completed questionnaire [p. 7]."
Basic demographic data for the distributions of respondents 
by sex, rank, and type of control of institution are presented in 
Table 4. Also included in Table 4 are comparable data drawn from
Insert Table 4 about here
a report developed by the National Center for Education Statistics 
(NCES) (1977). MacDonald (1978) used the NCES population data and 
data from earlier Carnegie and ACE (American Council on Education) 
surveys to demonstrate that the respondents to the 1977 Survey 
were representative of the American professoriate. As MacDonald 
concluded and as indicated by the data in Table 4, the comparisons 
show that the Survey is consonant with other population and sample 
data and therefore there is reason to have "confidence in the 
accuracy of the 1977 Survey as a portrait of the American profes­
soriate (p. 19)."
Not all observers share MacDonald's (JL978) confidence. Seve­
ral aspects of the 1977 Survey have been the subject of significant 
controversy in the popular press. Most of the criticism focused 
on two areas: response bias and question ambiguity. Dalenius
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Table 4
Demographic Distribution of Respondents 
(in percent)
1977 Survey NCESa
Male 81 77
Female 19 23
Professors 32 27
Associate Professors 25 29
Assistant Professors/Instructors 43 44
Public 73 69
Private 27 31
University 42 35
4-Year Institution 40 54
2-Year Institution 19 10
3
National Center for Educational Statistics
Note. From Technical Report: 1977 Survey of American Professoriate 
by R. K. MacDonald. Storrs: The University of Connecticut, Social 
Science Data Center, February, 1978, p. 23.
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(1979, p. 27) cited the former: "The implementation of the sampling 
design can only be characterized as a complete failure: The non­
response amounted to roughly 50 percent." In response to this 
criticism, Lipset argued that
the return rate was by no means low for a long 
written questionnaire and that in a 1975 survey 
500 nonrespondents were asked by telephone three 
questions from various sections of the question­
naire. "We found that the response pattern was 
almost identical," he said, adding that it was 
reasonable to assume that this would also apply 
to the 1977 Survey [Fiske, 1979, p. C4].
In addition to the 1975 survey of nonrespondents, two other steps 
were taken with respect to the response bias issue. First, and 
of some controversy itself, was the use of a weighting system to 
compensate for sampling errors, variations in response rates, and 
the intentional oversampling of certain groups. The weighting 
system is detailed in MacDonald (Note 2). The calculations used 
in deriving the weights are presented in Figure 3. Steps 2 and 3
Insert Figure 3 about here
were performed only on cells which were the subject of initial 
oversampling.
The second step taken to deal with the response bias question
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1. 1975 Percentage of Total Cases _ Pnro
1977 Percentage of Total Cases
Number of Core Cases_ = AdjustIIient Factor 
Number of Total Cases
3. Core Weight X Adjustment Factor = Preliminary Weight
4. Preliminary Weight X 2 = 1977 Weight
Figure 3: Calculations used in deriving weights
Note. From Technical Report: 1977 Survey of the American 
Professoriate by R. K. MacDonald. Storrs: The University of 
Connecticut, Social Science Data Center, February, 1978, p. 12.
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was the comparison of the weighted results to data from other sour­
ces. A sample of these comparisons is given in Table 4. With only 
minor exceptions, the 1977 Survey results appeared similar to the 
other data. MacDonald (Note 2, p. 21) presents rank, field, and 
institution-type data for weighted and unweighted respondents and 
for nonrespondents. Except for the areas of intentional oversamp­
ling, the distributions were similar.
The second general area of concern was question ambiguity.
Lang (Fiske, 1979, p. C4) argues that none of the responses to a 
request for a measure of agreement with a statement expressing an 
opinion about the government were acceptable. Ambiguity of word­
ing criticisms were focused on the opinion items of the Survey.
As this research utilized only questions asking for specific infor­
mation (such as, rank and number of publications), the assertion 
of question ambiguity did not apply and did not receive further 
cons iderat ion.
The question of bias in responses to specific items posed a 
more difficult problem for this research. The most sensitive ques­
tions used in the research asked for salary data. MacDonald (1978, 
p. 19) noted that the 1977 Survey salary average was above both 
of the results from other studies. There was, however, no reason 
to believe that any group of concern in this research was more 
prone to response manipulation than any other group. Therefore, 
for the purposes of testing for relative differences, the data was
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deemed sufficient.
The Questionnaire
The questionnaire was designed by Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. and 
Seymour Martin Lipset with the help of the staff of the Social 
Science Data Center and several contributors: Robert Merton,
Harriet Zuckerman, David Palmer, Michael O'Leary, Maryse Eymonerie, 
Leonard L. Ross, and Alice Rossi (MacDonald, 1978, p. 5). The 
instrument was pretested on a group of 50 of the designers' 
colleagues. These subjects were asked to evaluate the questions, 
design, and layout of the questionnaire.
The instrument included 128 questions covering 10 general 
areas: current concerns in higher education, the financial state 
of higher education, academic standards, faculty organization and 
collective representation, academic career data, faculty "renewal," 
national affairs, biographical data, norms of science and scholar­
ship, and professional activities in foreign countries. Although 
the research hypotheses discussed in Chapter 1 were not considered 
in the design of the questionnaire, the data required to test them 
was included in the sections covering academic career, faculty 
renewal, and biographical data. The data available for each of 
the categories of variables presented in Chapter 2 will be dis­
cussed. (Copies of the questionnaire items relating to each cate­
gory are included in Appendix A.)
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Inbreeding
Comparison of the responses to a request for a list of degrees, 
granting institutions, and years of award (Question 32) with insti­
tutional identification which was determined in the sample selec­
tion process yielded a measure of inbred status. However, since 
the anonymity of the respondents was guaranteed, institutional 
affiliations were not released in the data base. To compensate 
for this, Ms. Sally Daniels of the Roper Center constructed six
new variables matching current affiliation with the origin of 
\
each degree individually, with the origin of the highest degree 
only, and with the origin of any degree. These six variables 
allowed the identification of each subject as inbred or not inbred 
according to any single degree the individual holds or according 
to any combination of degrees. When combined with the specifica­
tion of the highest degree (Question 32), the new variables allowed 
the identification of inbreeding at the terminal degree level. 
Throughout this research, subjects are defined as inbred if they 
received their highest degree from the institution at which they 
are employed. "Silver cording," the practice of institutions hir­
ing their own graduates only after a period of teaching at another 
institution, was identified by combining the new variables and the 
number of institutional employers (Question 34).
Research Productivity
The data base provided separate variables for the lifetime
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production of journal articles (Question 48), and for the lifetime 
production of books and monographs (Question 47). The recent rate 
of productivity was available through the response to separate 
requests for the number of books, articles, and other writings pub­
lished or accepted in the last two years (Question 49). In addi­
tion to these traditional measures of research productivity, infor­
mation on the procurement of research grants was also available. 
Respondents were asked if they had ever received funding (Question 
50) and if they had received funding in the last 12 months (Ques­
tion 51). They were also asked to categorize the sources of the 
funds that were the basis for positive answers to Questions 50 and 
51 (Question 52).
Prestige
Unlike reserach productivity, prestige is a construct without 
accepted measurement criteria. As suggested by Caplow and McGee 
(1958, p. 91), mobility will be used as a surrogate for prestige. 
Respondents were asked whether they had received an offer of 
another job or a serious inquiry about availability within the 
last 2 years (Question 71). They were also asked whether they had 
sought or made serious inquiry about another position in the last 
2 years (Question 72).
In addition to the mobility data cited previously, the ques- 
tionnarie also asked "Comparing yourself with other academic per­
sons of your age and qualifications, how successful do you consider
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yourself in your career?" (Question 79). Although the question 
seems directly aimed at the concept of prestige, the "halo" effect 
of self-reporting by an ego-involved subject may yield results 
which do not adequately differentiate the various categories of 
respondents. Insufficient dispersion would require the exclusion 
of this variable from the analysis.
Other Descriptive Variables
To balance the common emphasis on reserach activities, data 
was collected on other descriptive variables. The 1977 Survey 
asked each respondent to specify how many hours per week were 
spent on various activities: administration, scheduled teaching, 
preparing for teaching, advising and counseling students, and 
research and scholarly writing (Questions 41 and 42). Unlike the 
research variables listed previously, the specification of hours 
of activity is a description of effort rather than results.
Work as a paid consultant is an increasingly important service 
option for many academics. Data on all consulting work and on 
work within the last 2 years was included in the Survey (Questions 
53 and 54). For both time periods, respondents were asked to 
specify the source of the consulting engagement (Question 55). 
Respondents were not asked to report consulting income, however, 
they were asked how much was earned above base salary (Question 
45).. While this income could come from any source, consulting is 
probably the single greatest source of outside revenues for most
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professors.
In addition to the information provided by responses describ­
ing allocation of time, important insights into faculty activity 
were gained from the respondents' perceptions of their roles. The 
Survey requested that each subject choose the terms which were the 
best and poorest descriptors of the subject from a list of five 
terms: intellectual, professional, scholar, scientist, and teacher. 
The respondents were also asked to evaluate whether their primary 
interests lie in research or teaching (Question 57) and whether or 
not their work is pure, applied, policy oriented, or literary 
(Question 58). A final question in this area (Question 59) asked 
the subjects whether their work is primarily theoretical or pri­
marily experimental, if that distinction is relevant to their dis­
cipline.
Compensation
Respondents were asked to indicate their gross institutional 
salary (Question 43) and to indicate whether the salary is based 
on a calendar or an academic year (Question 44). Responses to the 
gross salary question are scaled in uneven dollar increments. As 
noted in the discussion of consulting, the Survey also asked how 
much respondents had earned above their basic salary (Question 45). 
Demographics
Descriptive data on rank, tenure status, field, and personal 
characteristics were included in the Survey. Respondents were
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asked their present rank (Question 38) and the number of years in 
higher education, at their present institution, and in their pres­
ent rank (Question 35a, 35b, and 35c). Included in the responses 
to the request for information on the type of current appointment 
were separate categories for tenured and untenured positions 
(Question 39). Subjects with tenure were also asked to give the 
year in which tenure was awarded (Question 40).
Respondents were asked to give fields of specialty relating 
to four career factors: the field in which the postgraduate degree 
was taken; the field in which the current appointment was held; 
the principle teaching field; and the primary field of research, 
scholarship, and creativity (Question 46a, 46b, 46c, and 46d).
In addition to the professional demographics discussed pre­
viously, subjects were asked for sex, age, race, and marital sta­
tus (Questions 46, 108, 109, 112, and 106).
Statistical Hypotheses 
The data derived from the 1977 Survey was used to test the 
research hypotheses which were generally stated in Chapter 1. The 
first step in the analytical process was the derivation of more 
specific statistical hypotheses and the selection of methods for 
testing them. The hypotheses are described in this section of the 
chapter and the procedures guiding the analysis are explained in 
the subsequent section.
The first research hypothesis deals with the relationship of
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sex and institutional origin to productivity: Female inbred faculty 
have patterns of productivity which are significantly different 
from the patterns of productivity of male inbred faculty. Restated 
as a statistical hypothesis this becomes the null listed below: 
H^(Null)— there is no difference in productivity between 
female and male inbred faculty.
The second research hypothesis relates institutional origin 
to professional advancement: Inbred faculty show less professional 
advancement than outbred faculty. Retention, rank, and tenure sta­
tus are the significant professional variables in higher education. 
Because of the cross-sectional data and the difficulty in opera­
tionalizing the dependent variables, some ingenuity was required 
to develop statistical hypotheses in this area.
A problem in the specification of the hypotheses on profes­
sional advancement is the effect of sex on the dependent variables. 
As this research is interested in the differential effect of 
institutional origin on females and males, the hypotheses are sep­
arately stated for each sex. The effect of this design is to 
determine whether inbred faculty are treated significantly different 
from noninbred faculty of the same sex.
The question of retention is a significant one for inbred 
faculty. Bias against the very fact of inbreeding may lead to pre­
mature discontinuance which would not be justifiable on other 
grounds. The impact of institutional origin on longevity in the
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first position is considered in statistical hypothesis two:
H2a(Null)— there is no difference in the rate of retention at 
the first position between inbred and noninbred male faculty,
H_, (Null)— there is no difference in the rate of retention at
J.D
the first position between inbred and noninbred female faculty.
A critical measure of professional advancement is the years 
a faculty member serves before being promoted. Possibly, one 
detrimental effect of inbred status is the requirement of greater 
time in a lower rank for promotion. The third and fourth statis­
tical hypotheses examine the timing of promotions:
H^CNull)— there is no difference in years served prior to
promotion to associate professor between inbred and noninbred male 
faculty of that rank,
H^(Null)— there is no difference in years served prior to 
promotion to associate professor between inbred and noninbred fe­
male faculty of that rank,
H^a(Null)— there is no difference in years served prior to 
promotion to full professor between inbred and noninbred male 
faculty of that rank,
H^(Null)— there is no difference in years served prior to
promotion to full professor between inbred and noninbred female
faculty of that rank.
The achievement of tenure is essential to long-term profes­
sional advancement among faculty. Research on the tenure decision
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process requires information on those denied tenure as well as those 
given tenure. Cross-sectional data from faculty in existing posi­
tions is insufficient to model the tenure decision. However, some 
conclusions can be drawn from the existing data.
As hypotheses three and four can test time to promotion only 
for those who have been promoted it is possible that a bias against 
one group might not be apparent in these tests. If the bias re­
sulted in a person being held at a lower rank, the individual would 
never enter the sample for a test of time to promotion. Hypothesis 
five examines the effect of institutional origin and sex on the 
very fact of promotion:
H^a(Null)— there is no difference in the distribution of ranks 
between inbred and noninbred male faculty.
H^(Null)— there is no difference in the distribution of ranks 
between inbred and noninbred female faculty.
Analogous to the number of years served prior to promotion is 
the time served before the granting of tenure. It is possible that 
a bias against inbred faculty may result in an increase in the time 
required prior to the receipt of tenure. The sixth hypothesis 
examines the relationship between sex, inbred status, and service 
prior to the granting of tenure.
Hga(Null)— there is no difference in the years served prior to 
the receipt of tenure between inbred and noninbred tenured male faculty, 
Hg^(Null)— there is no difference in the years served prior to 
the receipt of tenure between inbred and noninbred tenured female faculty.
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In addition to professional advancement, faculty members also 
receive compensation as a reward for their efforts. The third 
research hypothesis, relating institutional origin to levels of 
compensation, is embodied in the seventh statistical hypothesis: 
H^(Null)— there is no difference in institutional rewards 
between inbred faculty and outbred faculty.
Analysis
The seven statistical hypotheses in the previous section were 
tested using the 1977 Survey data. Unless otherwise noted, only 
faculty with Ph.D., Ed.D. or other non-professional doctorates 
were included in the analyses.
Statistical Hypothesis One
The first statistical hypothesis examines the difference be­
tween the productivity of male and female inbred faculty. The 
analysis for this hypothesis started with the extraction of the 
male and female members of the inbred faculty as subsamples. Dis­
criminant analysis was performed to develop a model for differen­
tiating between the two groups using productivity values as predic­
tor variables.
When discriminant analysis is used to determine whether there 
are significant differences between defined groups, two assumptions 
must be met. The predictor variables must be normally distributed 
and have equal dispersion matrices. The latter need not be known; 
it is equality and not magnitude which is assumed.
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The standard test to determine the significance of the dif­
ference between two groups in discriminant analysis is the 
2
Mahalanobis D . This statistic measures the separation of the 
group means along the discriminant axis and is distributed as an 
F-statistic in the two-group case (Green & Tull, 1975, p. 458). 
Statistical Hypothesis Two
The second statistical hypothesis examines the relationship 
between institutional origin and retention. The latter is speci­
fied as retention at the first academic position. Ideally, this 
hypothesis should be tested with longitudinal data following 1 or 
more cohorts through the early career years. As this analysis is 
not possible with the 1977 Survey data, a cross-sectional substi­
tute was devised.
The sample was divided into cohorts based on the year in which 
each subject was awarded a terminal degree and on sex. The sub­
jects in each cohort were identified as inbred or noninbred and as 
holding their initial appointment or holding a second or subsequent 
appointment. The significance of the difference in the frequency 
of retention between inbreds and noninbreds was tested separately 
for each cohort using a Chi-square test.
Not only did this analysis provide information on each cohort's 
retention rates, it also allowed observation of changes in the pat­
tern of significance over the various year groups. To the extent 
that multiyear, cross-sectional data can be used to generalize
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about individual career progression, the changes in the signifi­
cance across cohorts of increasing experience provided information 
about retention prospects for early and future cohorts.
Statistical Hypotheses Three and Four
The third and fourth statistical hypotheses examine the timing 
of promotion to associate- and full-professor, respectively. Test­
ing these hypotheses began with the selection of 4 subsamples 
based on rank and sex at the time of the Survey: 2 for associate 
professors, male and female; and 2 for full professors, male and 
female. The former are used to test hypothesis three and the lat­
ter, hypothesis four.
As productivity variables have a significant influence on rate 
of promotion, the analysis used for the hypotheses controlled for 
these effects through the use of analysis of covariance. The 
dependent variable was years served prior to promotion to present 
rank; the treatment variable was institutional origin; and, the 
covariates were productivity measures.
Statistical Hypothesis Five
Statistical hypothesis five examines the relationship between 
institutional origin, sex, and promotion. A Chi-square test was 
used to compare ranks to institutional origin for each of 2 sub­
samples based on sex.
Statistical Hypothesis Six
The relation between the time served prior to the granting of
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tenure and institutional origin is the subject of the sixth hypo­
thesis. Subsamples were drawn for female and male tenured faculty. 
Combination of information on the year in which subjects first 
taught and the year in which they got tenure allows a determination 
of the years served prior to the receipt of tenure. As years to 
tenure may be at least partially based on productivity, analysis 
of covariance controlling for productivity measures was used to 
test this hypothesis.
Statistical Hypothesis Seven
The seventh statistical hypothesis examines the relationship 
between institutional rewards and origin. The dependent variable 
for the analysis is salary. As outlined in Chapter 2, the metho­
dology for testing this hypothesis was developed to identify dis­
crimination usually due to race or sex. In this analysis noninbred 
faculty were considered the favored group.
The basic identification methodology started with the develop­
ment of a regression model explaining the salary of noninbred 
faculty in terms of predictor variables including several demo­
graphic characteristics, research productivity, prestige, and other 
descriptive variables. (The exact specifications of the model are 
given in Chapter 4.) The next step in the analysis was to substi­
tute the independent values for each inbred subject into the 
regression equation to obtain individual predicted salaries for the 
inbred group. These predicted salaries reflect the level of com-
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pensation an inbred faculty member would have received if he or 
she had been compensated on the same basis as a noninbred person.
Previous work (surveyed in Chapter 2) on the use of regression 
analysis in salary inequity proceeds from the determination of pre­
dicted salaries for the unfavored group by inspection. As the 
methodology was designed to support decision-making about salary 
adjustments in individual cases, no hypothesis testing extension 
had been developed. For the purposes of this research, it was 
necessary to test the significance of the differences between the 
predicted and actual salaries of the inbred subjects. This was 
done by performing a t-test on the predicted and actual salaries.
Summary
The research strategy presented in this chapter was directed 
at gaining generalizability through breadth using the most compre­
hensive data base available. The 1977 Survey of the American 
Professoriate was designed and implemented under the direction of 
Everett Car11 Ladd, Jr. and Seymour Martin Lipset. It included 128 
questions covering a broad range of academic concerns and was sent 
to 8,967 faculty members. Of the 4,607 returned, 4,383 usable 
responses were obtained.
Data for the items which described the various categories cited 
in Chapter 2 (research productivity, prestige, other descriptive 
variables, compensation, and demographics) were used in this analy­
sis. Several "custom" variables were added to the basic data base
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to allow the identification of inbred faculty without compromising 
any respondent's annonymity.
There were six statistical hypotheses derived from the three 
research hypotheses listed in Chapter 1. The translation of the 
first hypothesis, relating sex of inbred faculty to productivity, 
and the third hypothesis relating institutional origin to compen­
sation, were straightforward.
Operationalizing the second hypothesis was more problematical 
because of the lack of longitudinal data and difficulty in speci­
fying the dependent variables. The result was four hypotheses 
which examine the relationship of institutional origin to retention 
rates, years served prior to promotion, and contract status.
Determination and evaluation of salary differences required 
the addition of an hypothesis test to the accepted identification 
mode. Testing the statistical hypotheses involved discriminant 
analysis, Chi-square tests, analysis of covariance, and regression 
analysis leading to a J^ -test. The results of these analyses are 
presented in the next chapter.
Chapter 4 
THE RESULTS
The findings of the analyses proposed in the description of 
the methodology are reported in this chapter. After an initial 
section that provides some comparative descriptive statistics, the 
results of each of the statistical hypotheses are presented. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the findings.
Inbreeding Past and Present
One benefit of the research on inbreeding is the availability 
of statistical results from early studies for comparison with cur­
rent findings. Before starting the specific tests described in 
Chapter Three, two kinds of descriptive statistics were run to 
obtain a better understanding of the composition of the sample and 
to provide results which could be compared to previous studies.
The computations for the percentage of inbred faculty with 
terminal degrees based on the Eells and Cleveland (1935a) data 
were presented in Chapter Two. Results for the 1935 data and com­
parable findings from the 1977 Survey are presented in Table 5.
The rate of inbreeding for holders of the doctoral degree has 
dropped from sixteen percent to eleven percent.
Insert Table 5
Eells and Cleveland (1935a) also presented figures for the 
percentage of inbreeding in several academic disciplines. Corre-
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TABLE 5
Percent of Total Faculty Inbred(Doctorate)___________
1977 Survey
1935 Eells and Cleveland Study
11.0
16.1
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sponding calculations were run on the 1977 Survey data. The re­
sults presented in Table 6 use the category names from the Eells
Insert Table 6
and Cleveland survey. One of the fields posed significant prob­
lems when the attempt was made to match it with the current data. 
The 1977 survey contained no separate category for ancient langu­
ages, hence the comparison of the earlier modern languages figure 
with the current foreign languages category is misleading and is 
omitted from the table. With the exception of the field of home 
economics, the percentages of inbred faculty have declined.
Statistical Hypothesis One 
The first statistical hypothesis addressed the productivity 
differences between inbred men and women:
(Null) —  there is no difference in productivity between 
female and male inbred faculty.
The test of this hypothesis was based on discriminant analysis 
using the sex of the inbred faculty members to determine group 
membership. Only those subjects with academic doctorates (Ph.D., 
Ed.D., or other doctorates except first professional degrees) were 
chosen for the analysis. The data included 284 men and 50 women 
with doctorates granted by the institution at which they are cur­
rently faculty members. The actual number of subjects included 
in each of the analyses varied slightly due to the treatment of
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TABLE 6
Percent of Inbred Faculty by Field
Field Eells & Cleveland 
1935
1977
Survey
Biological Science 40 14
Chemistry 37 6
Education 34 12
Physical Education 34 5
Mathematics 33 7
English 32 5
History 31 11
Physical Sciences 28 10
Social Sciences 27 6
Home Economics 22 22
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missing data. Before the discriminant analyses were run, two pre­
liminary steps were taken. An analysis was run to examine the dis­
tribution of subjects by academic specialty and several new vari­
ables were developed from items in the 1977 Survey. The analysis 
and the items are described in the next part of this section, prior 
to the discussion of the discriminant analysis.
As the norms for many of the productivity measures vary by 
fields, a preliminary Chi-square was performed to determine whether 
the distribution of the inbred faculty across fields varied accord­
ing to sex. The test did not reject the null hypothesis that the 
distributions are drawn from the same population. The results of 
the test are shown in Table 7.
Insert Table 7
A concern about the comparability of measures of research 
productivity led to the creation of several new variables from 
items existing in the data base. To control for varying lengths 
of time served as a faculty member, the two variables for total 
article and total book production were divided by the number of 
years of experience since the granting of the most recent degree. 
The new variables, designated ARATE for articles and BRATE for 
books, reflect the rate of production per year of experience and 
can therefore be compared across subjects with different lengths 
of experience.
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TABLE 7
Chi-Square Analysis of Field by Sex for Inbred Faculty
Fielda
Social
Sciences
Humanities/ 
Fine Arts
Natural
Sciences
Applied
Professional
Fields
Sex
Males 51 26 82 116
Females 12 7 11 17
ax2(3) = 3-083» P = *379
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A second concern about the comparability of measures of re­
search productivity is derived from data describing how the sub­
jects allocate their time. An individual in a job situation which 
requires heavy non-research efforts cannot be fairly compared to 
an individual who is free to devote a large quantity of time to 
research. To control for the amount of effort devoted to research, 
ARATE and BRATE were divided by a measure of the number of hours 
devoted to research. The resulting variables, AREF and BREF, mea­
sure the rate of productivity per year of experience adjusted for 
the amount of time available (for articles and books, respectively.)
To guard against the homogenizing effect of the ARATE and 
BRATE computations, which would portray a person who had a prolific 
early career and no recent publications in the same way as a stea­
dily producing person if the data were comparable, the number of 
books, articles, and other writings produced in the last two years 
was included. These variables were also adjusted for the amount 
of time devoted to research, resulting in new variables for two- 
year production of books (B2EF), articles (A2EF), and other writ­
ings (02EF).
The basic technique used to evaluate the data for statistical 
hypothesis one was discriminant analysis. A stepwise procedure 
utilizing the smallest Wilks' Lambda as the criterion for variables 
selection was used. A complete description of the technique can 
be found in Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner, and Bent (1975).
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Minor modifications of the procedure related to the 8.0 version of 
the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences are explained in 
Hull and Nie (1979). The test for the equality of the group cen­
troids was an F ratio based on the Mahalonobis distance between 
the groups (Nie, et alia, 1975, p. 460).
Because of the broad range of productivity variables, several 
analyses were run. The first used all variables; the others uti­
lized only one type of productivity measures: separate analyses 
were run for output (using each of 2 different definitions of 
research output) and for effort. The variables included in each 
of the analyses are presented in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 4
Analysis One
The first analysis included all the available productivity 
variables except those which were made redundant by the inclusion 
of the created variables reflecting effort in the measurement of 
research productivity (AREF, BREF, A2EF, B2EF, 02EF). The results 
of the discriminant analysis are presented in Table 8. Standar-
Insert Table 8
dized discriminant function coefficients are shown for each of 
the 11 variables chosen by the Wilks criterion. The F-test for 
the significance of the Mahalonobis distance between groups was
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Analyses
Variable 1 2a 2b 3
Weekly hours of administration X X
Weekly hours of teaching X X
Weekly hours of preparation X X
Weekly hours of counseling X X
Weekly hours of formal instruction X X
Above salary earnings X X
Number of books published (last 2 years) X
Number of articles published (last 2 years) X
Other writings published (last 2 years) X
Receipt of research funding (ever) X X X
Receipt of research funding (last year) X X X
Service as paid consultant (ever) X X X
Service as paid consultant (last 2 years) X X X
Primary interest: Teaching/Research X
Research: Pure or Basic X
Research: Applied X
Research: Policy oriented X
Research: Literary or expressive X
Research: Theoretical or experimental X
Articles: Rate of production (ARATE) X
Books: Rate of production (BRATE) X
Articles: Rate of productivity adjusted
by effort (AREF) X X
Books: Rate of productivity adjusted
by effort (BREF) X X
Articles: Last 2 years' productivity
adjusted by effort (A2EF) X X
Books: Last 2 years's productivity
adjusted by effort (B2EF) X X
Other Writings: Last 2 years' productivity
adjusted by effort (02EF) X X
Figure 4: Variables Used in the Analyses
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TABLE 8
Results of Discriminant Analysis of All Productivity Variables
Variables in the Final g
Discriminant Function
Standardized Discriminant 
Function Coefficients
Research funding in last 12 months -.55
Percentage of above salary earnings .49
Books: 2 year productivity adjusted
for effort .66
Books: rate of productivity adjusted
for effort -.81
Articles: rate of productivity
adjusted for effort .53
Service as a paid consultant
in the last two years .34
Research described as "applied" -.36
Articles: 2 year productivity
adjusted for effort -.47
Research described as "policy-
oriented" .25
Weekly hours of formal instruction .27
Weekly hours of administration .24
aF value = 4.01, p = .000
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significant at the .001 level. The null hypotheiss of no diffe­
rence between groups was rejected.
Analysis Two
The second analysis was designed to test for differences on 
output variables defined as standard research measures and indica­
tions of service as a consultant and of receipt of research funding. 
The analysis was run twice: the first run (2a) included research 
measures adjusted for both experience and effort; the second (2b) 
included an adjustment only for experience.
Table 9 shows the results of both the 2a and 2b analyses. Six
Insert Table 9
variables entered the first of the discriminant functions and 2 
entered the second. Both F-tests were statistically significant 
at the .001 level. The hypothesis that the group centroids for 
output measures were equal was rejected.
Analysis Three
The third analysis included only variables reflecting the 
subjects distribution of effort. Weekly hours of administration, 
teaching, preparation, counseling, and formal instruction were 
combined with percentage of above salary earnings. The former are 
direct measures of input while the latter is a surrogate for hours 
spent outside the institution.
The results of the third analysis are shown in Table 10. Two
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TABLE 9
Results of Analyses Using Output Variables
Variables in the Final
Discriminant Function
Standardized Discriminant 
Function Coefficients
3.Analysis 2a: Adjusted for Experience and Effort
Research funding in the last 
year .58
Books: 2 year productivity 
adjusted for effort -.69
Books: Rate of productivity 
adjusted for effort .84
Articles: 2 year productivity 
adjusted for effort .75
Articles: Rate of productivity 
adjusted for effort -.52
Other writings: 2 year pro­
ductivity adjusted for effort -.43
Analysis 2b: Adjusted for experience*5
Research funding in the last 
year .91
Books: Overall productivity 
adjusted for experience .34
aF yalue = 4.28, p = .0004 
**F value = 6.67, p = .001
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Insert Table 10
variables, above salary earnings and weekly hours of teaching, 
entered the equation. The distance between the groups was signifi­
cant at the .01 level leading to the rejection of the null hypo­
thesis that there was no difference between the groups on effort 
measures.
Statistical Hypothesis Two 
The impact of institutional origin on longevity is considered 
separately for males and females in statistical hypotheses 2a and 
2b:
H„ —  there is no difference in the rate of retention at the 
l a
first position between inbred and noninbred male faculty,
H_, —  there is no difference in the rate of retention at the 
l b
first position between inbred and noninbred female faculty.
These (and all other) hypotheses were tested only on faculty with 
academic doctorates holding positions at research or doctoral 
granting universities. This group was divided into cohorts based 
on the year in which the doctorate was received. Each hypothesis 
was tested separately for each of the cohorts. As it is unlikely 
that there would be a significant change in the patterns of reten­
tion beyond the tenth year, the analyses were run only for those 
receiving doctorates after 1967.
Chi-square tests were run to determine the significance of
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TABLE 10
Results of Analysis Using Effort Variables
Variables in the Final Standardized Discriminant
Discriminant Function Function Coefficients
Above Salary Earnings .98
Weekly Hours of Teaching -.35
aF value = 4.70, p = .009
95
the relation between institutional origin and rate of retention.
For cohorts with less than 21 cases, Fisher's exact test was used; 
for larger cohorts, Yates' corrected Chi-square was used. The 
results of the analysis for males are shown in Table 11 and for 
females in Table 12.
Insert Tables 11 and 12
As the Tables show, only two of the twenty tests were signifi­
cant at the p < .05 level. There is no reason to reject the null 
hypotheses, which posit no relationship between the two factors.
The number of inbred and noninbred subjects for each cohort is 
listed with the percentage of each group still in the first posi­
tion.
The small number of inbred faculty in many of the cohorts 
makes the results involving these cells suspect. Generalizations 
which depend on small numbers of subjects are tenuous at best. To 
alleviate the problem of small cell n's, the Chi-square analyses 
were run again, separately for males and females, for all subjects 
in any of the ten cohorts. [Results of these analyses are shown 
in Table 13 for males and Table 14 for females.]
Insert Tables 13 and 14
The Chi-square results are significant at the p < .05 level 
for both the female and male faculty, indicating a rejection of
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TABLE 11
PERCENTAGE OF INBRED AND NONINBRED FACULTY 
HOLDING FIRST ACADEMIC POSITION BY YEAR OF DOCTORATE FOR MALES
Year
Doctorate
Conferred
INBRED NONINBRED
Percent at 1st
Total 
Position n Percent at 1st
Total 
Position n
1977 75.0 4 76.9 13
1976 75.0 4 61.5 39
1975 77.8 9 74.5 47
1974 80.0 10 59.5 84
1973 75.0 12 53.8 93
1972* 91.7 12 48.6 107
1971* 100.0 7 50.0 92
1970 75.0 16 54.5 110
1969 83.3 12 53.9 89
1968 76.9 13 45.5 99
* p < .05
97
TABLE 12
PERCENTAGE OF INBRED AND NONINBRED FACULTY 
HOLDING FIRST ACADEMIC POSITION BY YEAR OF DOCTORATE FOR FEMALES
INBRED NONINBRED
Year -____________________________________________________
Doctorate Total Total
Conferred Percent at 1st Position n Percent at 1st Position n
1977 50.0 2 83.3 6
1976 0.0 1 76.9 13
1975 71.4 7 56.0 25
1974 100.0 3 45.5 22
1973 100.0 2 50.0 16
1972 100.0 3 46.2 13
1971 66.7 3 50.0 18
1970 100.0 2 42.9 3
1969 66.7 3 53.8 13
1968 66.7 3 50.0 10
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TABLE 13
CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF INBRED AND NON-INBRED MALE FACULTY 
HOLDING FIRST AND SUBSEQUENT ACADEMIC POSITIONS
Position
Origin
First Subsequent
Inbred 80 19
Noninbred 420 353
a 2
x CD = 24.075 p = .000
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TABLE 14
CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS OF INBRED AND NON-INBRED 
FEMALE FACULTY HOLDING FIRST AND SUBSEQUENT ACADEMIC POSITIONS
Position
Origin
First Subsequent
Inbred 22 7
Noninbred 77 66
ax2(1) = 3.925 p = 0.047
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the null hypotheses that there is no relation between retention 
at the first position and institutional origin. The data shows a 
much higher percentage of inbred faculty still in the first posi­
tion. This is contrary to the idea that inbred faculty are forced 
out of their first positions with a higher frequency than nonin- 
breds.
Statistical Hypothesis Three 
Statistical hypotheses 3a and 3b examined the relationship 
between years served prior to promotion and institutional origin 
for male and female associate professors:
H^a —  there is no difference in years served prior to promo­
tion to associate professor between inbred and noninbred male 
faculty of that rank,
—  there is no difference in years served prior to pro­
motion to associate professor between inbred and noninbred female 
faculty of that rank.
One-way analysis of covariance was used to test the relation­
ship between years to promotion and institutional origin while con­
trolling for the effects of four important productivity variables. 
The number of covariates was kept to a minimum to meet the restric­
tions of the computational package. The four variables chosen as 
covariates were
Weekly hours of administration
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Weekly hours of formal Instruction 
Number of books published (total)
Number of articles published (total).
The covariates were chosen because of their possible influ­
ence on the promotion decision. All four reflect productive ef­
forts which affect the institution. The variables for total counts 
for books and articles were used rather than rates of production, 
because promotion decisions are more likely to be based on total 
works with some required threshold number. Rates of productivity 
would not differentiate between a first year person with two pub­
lications and a fourth year person with eight, while it is, of 
course, more likely that the latter would receive a promotion.
The time spent in administration and formal instruction reflect 
the other two primary tasks which benefit the institution. No 
variables were included which measured time spent in consulting 
or other external activities as it was concluded that these ef­
forts rarely have a significant impact on promotion decisions.
The results of the analyses (shown in Table 15) reveal the 
differential impact of institutional origin on years to promotion
Insert Table 15 About Here
to associate. The main effect, inbreeding, is significant at the 
p < .05 level for female faculty only. While one of the product!-
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TABLE 15
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE RESULTS FOR YEARS SERVED
PRIOR TO PROMOTION TO ASSOCIATE
Source of Variation F Value F Significance
Males (n=614)
Covariates
Weekly hours of administration 2.621 0.106
Weekly hours of formal instruction 3.186 0.075
Number of books published 6.229 0.013
Number of articles published 0.458 0.499
Main Effects
Inbreeding 0.214 0.644
Females (n=7 3)
Covariates
Weekly hours of administration 0.019 0.890
Weekly hours of formal instruction 0.005 0.942
Number of books published 0.981 0.326
Number of articles published 0.259 0.612
Main Effects
Inbreeding 4.518 0.037
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tivlty variables is significantly related to time to promotion for 
males, none are for females. The mean time to promotion to associ­
ate professor is 7.62 years for inbred women and 5.60 years for 
noninbred women.
Statistical Hypothesis Four 
Statistical hypotheses 4a and 4b examine the same basic re­
lationship as the two previous hypotheses, with the subject group 
changed to full professors and the time variable measured as years 
to promotion to that rank:
H^a —  there is no difference in years served prior to promo­
tion to full professor between inbred and noninbred male faculty 
of that rank,
—  there is no difference in years served prior to promo­
tion to full professor between inbred and noninbred female faculty 
of that rank.
One-way analysis of covariance was again used to test this 
relationship. The subjects included all full professors holding 
academic doctoral degrees teaching at research or doctoral grant­
ing universities. The four covariates used to test Hypotheses 3a 
and 3b were used in these analyses as these general criteria for 
promotion apply regardless of the rank.
The results (shown in Table 16) indicate that the main effect,
Insert Table 16 About Here
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TABLE 16
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE RESULTS FOR YEARS SERVED
PRIOR TO PROMOTION TO FULL PROFESSOR
Source of Variation F Value F Significance
Males Cn=953)
Covariates
Weekly hours of administration 0.690 0.406
Weekly hours of formal instruction 2.051 0.152
Number of books published 9.942 0.002
Number of articles published 19.040 0.000
Main Effects
Inbreeding 0.988 0.318
Females (n=79)
Covariates
Weekly hours of administration 0.960 0.330
Weekly hours of formal instruction 0.015 0.902
Number of books published 1.075 0.303
Number of articles published 1.606 0.209
Main Effects
Inbreeding 0.008 0.929
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inbreeding, was not significantly related to years served prior to
promotion to full professor for either males or females. The null
hypothesis cannot be rejected. As with the results for time to
associate, there are productivity variables which are significant
for males, but there are none which are significant for females.
It is interesting to note that the average time to full professor
is slightly less for inbreds of both sexes.
Statistical Hypothesis Five
The relationship between rank and institution origin is
examined in hypotheses 5a and 5b:
Hc —  There is no difference in the distribution of ranks 5a
between inbred and noninbred male faculty.
HC1_ —  there is no difference in the distribution of ranks 
5b
between inbred and noninbred female faculty.
As the results in Table 17 show, the Chi-square statistic is
Insert Table 17 About Here
significant for male faculty, but not significant for female fac­
ulty. The null hypothesis of no relationship between origin and 
distribution of ranks is rejected for men only. The extension of 
the analysis to an examination of the percentage of inbred and 
noninbred males does not reveal a clear direct or inverse rela­
tionship between inbreeding and rank. The percent of inbred 
faculty at the instructor, full professor, and distinguished pro-
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TABLE 17
CHI-SQUARE RESULTS FOR FACULTY IN RANK BY INSTITUTIONAL ORIGIN
Rank Inbred
ORIGIN
Outbred
Males
Distinguished Professor 13 44
Full Professor 143 894
Associate Professor 63 594
Assistant Professor 50 436
Instructor 7 13
Chi-Square 23.929
Significance 0.000
Females
Distinguished Professor 0 0
Full Professor 12 72
Associate Professor 17 67
Assistant Professor 20 112
Instructor 1 5
Chi-Square 1.329
Significance 0.722
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fessor ranks are greater than the percent of nonlnbred faculty at 
these ranks.
Statistical Hypothesis Six
Statistical hypotheses 6a and 6b are analogous to hypotheses
3 and 4 in that they measure time to receipt of an institutional
reward —  in this case tenure:
R ,  —  there is no difference in the years served prior to 
6a
receipt of tenure between inbred and noninbred male faculty.
—  there is no difference in the years served prior to 
receipt of tenure between inbred and noninbred female faculty.
As with the third and fourth hypotheses, analysis of covari­
ance was used to test hypotheses 6a and 6b. Because of the simi­
larity in the criteria for the promotion and tenure decisions, the 
same four institutional productivity variables were used as covari­
ates. Only tenured faculty at research or doctoral granting insti­
tutions with academic doctorates were included in this analysis.
The effect of inbreeding is not significant for either males 
or females (see Table 18). The only F-ratio that is significant
Insert Table 18 About Here
in this analysis is the relationship of the number of books pro­
duced to years to tenure for male faculty.
Statistical Hypothesis Seven 
The existence of wage discrimination in the compensation of
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TABLE 18
ANALYSIS OF COVARIANCE RESULTS
FOR YEARS SERVED PRIOR TO THE RECEIPT OF TENURE
Source of Variation F Value Significance
Males (n=1593)
Covariates
Weekly hours of administration 0.655 0.419
Weekly hours of formal instruction 0.100 0.751
Number of books published 14.498 0.000
Number of articles published 2.555 0.110
Main Effect
Inbreeding 2.309 0.129
Females (n=156)
Covariates
Weekly hours of administration 1.321 0.244
Weekly hours of formal instruction 0.246 0.621
Number of books published 0.218 0.642
Number of articles published 0.004 0.953
Main Effect
Inbreeding 0.203 0.653
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inbred faculty is considered in the single seventh statistical hy­
pothesis:
—  there is no difference in institutional rewards between 
inbred and noninbred faculty.
Unlike the preceeding five hypotheses, the seventh is not 
written separately for female and male faculty because the regres­
sion methodology conveniently allows the inclusion of sex as a 
dummy independent variable.
The testing of this hypothesis involved three distinct steps: 
the development of a model of the salaries of noninbred faculty 
through the use of regression analysis; the use of this model to 
predict the salaries of inbred faculty; and the determination of 
the significance of the difference between the predicted and 
actual salaries for the inbred faculty.
A regression model was developed using the Statistical Analy­
sis System (SAS Institute, 1979) for the 2323 noninbred faculty 
holding academic doctorates and teaching at research and doctoral 
granting universities. The independent variables were selected 
according to impact on salary. Most of the variables are standard 
effort and productivity measures. Several, however, require more 
explanation. Two, race and sex, are not legitimate salary deter­
minants. Nevertheless, it was felt that they were likely to have 
a significant impact on the existing pattern of remuneration and 
consequently they were included in the analysis. The size of the
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coefficients for these variables (both were significant at the 
p < .05 level) indicate that the a  priori assumptions about their 
importance were justified. Age and experience appear as squared 
variables because the compounding nature of salary increments often 
leads to a curvilinear relationship with time variables. A final 
non-productivity variable was a measure of the prestige of the 
institution with lower numbers representing higher prestige. The 
coefficients for the variables, the intercept, and the percent of 
variance;explained are shown in Table 19.
Insert Table 19 About Here
Values for the independent variables for each of the 353 in- 
bred faculty were multiplied by the coefficients obtained in the 
previous step, resulting in a predicted salary for each inbred 
subject. This figure represents the amount the people would have 
earned if ...theys’ . had been rewarded for their efforts, produc­
tivity, and other characteristics as noninbred faculty were com­
pensated. A residual value for each subject was calculated by 
subtracting the actual salary from the predicted amount.
The mean of the distribution of residuals was $426, indica­
ting that the inbred faculty were paid, on the average, $426 less 
than noninbred faculty with equivalent attributes. A t-statistic 
was computed to test the hypothesis that the mean of the popula­
tion equalled zero. The t-value (1.86) is significant at the
Ill
TABLE 19
RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR HYPOTHESIS 7
Independent Variables Coefficient
Books
none
1-2
3-4
5-10
more than 10
Articles
none
1-2
3-4
5-10
11-20
21-30
31-50
more than 50
Weekly Hours of Teaching
none 1193
1-4 547
5-6 177
7-8 -288
9-10 -342
11-12 -118
13-16 -1200
17-20 -2649
more than 20 -1068
jekly Hours of Research and Scholarly Writing
none -500
1-4 -282
5-8 -319
9-16 -40
17-34 191
more than 34 -381
-801
-353
919
1702
1821
-5388
-4976
-4465
-4482
-3039
-1945
-1304
699
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Weekly Hours of Counseling Students
none 349
1-4 35
5-8 2
9-16 -332
17-34 -771
more than 34 -4310
Weekly Hours of Administration
none -34
1-4 122
5-8 672
9-16 791
17-34 3281
more than 34 4016
Sex 814
Race 761
Field
Social Sciences 59
Humanities and Fine Arts -1413
Natural Sciences -557
Applied Professional fields 885
Experience 454
Experience squared -5
Age squared 0
Prestige -95
Other results
Intercept
2
Adjusted R
$19,216
.59
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p < .05 level, indicating that the null hypothesis (that the mean 
equals zero) was rejected.
Discussion
The results of the three analyses for the first statistical 
hypothesis (summarized in Figure 5) support the rejection of the
Insert Figure 5 About Here
?
null hypothesis. All four related tests of the D statistic were 
significant at' least at the p < .01 level. Regardless of which 
set of variables was included, significant differences between 
inbred women and inbred men were found. The variables which were 
significant in the analyses, when combined with information pro­
vided by the means of the male and female groups on those vari­
ables (.shown in Table 20), provided insight into the nature of
Insert Table 20 About Here
the differences between the groups.
In the overall analysis (1), the standardized discriminant 
coefficients indicated that the rate of production for total books 
adjusted for effort had the highest relative contribution to the 
discriminant function. An examination of the means for this vari­
able indicated a higher productivity for women than for men.
The next highest coefficient was computed for the production 
of books in the last 2 years, adjusted by effort. The means on
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Figure 5: Summary of Results for Hypothesis One
Analysis
Number
Variables
Included
Significance
Level
Null
Rejected
One All productivity .001 Yes
Two a Output (adjusted 
for experience and 
effort) .001 Yes
Two b Output (adjusted 
for experience only) .001 Yes
Three Effort .01 Yes
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TABLE 20
MEANS BY SEX FOR VARIABLES IN DISCRIMINANT FUNCTIONS
Variable Males Females
Weekly Hours of Teaching 2.83 2.94
Weekly Hours of Administration 2.79 2.64
Weekly Hours of Formal Instruction 3.38 3.40
Above Salary Earnings 3.23 2.46
Receipt of Research Funding (last year) 1.38 1.64
Service as a Paid Consultant (last 2 years) 1.32 1.33
Research: Applied 1.17 1.30
Research: Policy-oriented 1.56 1.54
Articles: Rate of Production Adjusted 
by Effort (AREF) 0.15 0.17
Books: Rate of Production Adjusted 
by Effort (BREF) 0.07 0.10
Articles: Last Two Years Productivity 
Adjusted by Effort (A2EF) 2.13 2.62
Books: Last Two Years Productivity 
Adjusted by Effort (B2EF) 1.61 1.41
Other Writings: Last Two Years Productivity 
Adjusted by Effort (02EF) 2.00 2.04
Books: Overall Productivity Adjusted for 
Experience (BRATE) 0.21 0.26
aBinary variables coded Yes = 1 and No = 2
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this variable indicated that male inbred faculty had produced more 
books in the last two years per unit of effort. Males were also 
more likely to have received research funding in the last twelve 
months (the third variable in terms of importance) and had higher 
percentages of above salary earnings (the fifth variable).
The means of the fourth and sixth variables (in terms of 
coefficient size), rate of total article production adjusted by 
effort (AREF), and production of articles in the last two years 
adjusted by effort (A2EF), Showed greater productivity by women.
On other significant variables, women did more formal instruction 
while men did more administration and were more likely to have 
served as a paid consultant.
The overall pattern shown in the results of the first dis­
criminant analysis was that women show higher performance in the 
traditional institutional areas while men seem to emphasize exter­
nal pursuits. Women had higher productivity for both article 
categories and one of the two book categories. They also spent 
more time in formal instruction. The male orientation toward ex­
ternal activities was demonstrated in higher above salary earnings 
and higher probabilities for the receipt of research funding and 
appointment as a paid consultant.
The analyses of the first statistical hypothesis using only 
productivity variables (2a and 2b) show much the same results as 
the overall analysis (1). Where the variables are adjusted for
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both experience and effort (2a), overall book productivity is 
again the most heavily weighted variable. It is followed by two- 
year article productivity and two-year book productivity. Six of 
the nine possible variables are included in the discriminant func­
tion. The three excluded items are binary variables reflecting 
receipt of research funding and work as a paid consultant.
Only two of the nine variables available in the analysis of 
productivity adjusted for experience (2b) were included in the 
final solution. Receipt of research funding in the last year and 
the number of books produced adjusted for years of experience 
were the only variables in the function.
The third analysis included only variables reflecting effort. 
Above salary earnings and weekly hours of teaching appeared in the 
final discriminant function. Examination of the means on these 
variables indicate that men have higher above salary earnings and 
women spend more time in the classroom.
The results of the analyses for statistical hypothesis two 
(summarized with the results for hypotheses 3 through 6)in Figure 
6 indicated that there was a significant difference in retention
Insert Figure 6
rates for both sexes when ten one-year cohorts are studied to­
gether. The distribution of faculty indicated that it was more 
likely that an inbred subject would stay at the first position.
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Figure 6
Summary of the Results for Statistical Hypotheses 2 through 6
Hypothesis
Number
Dependent
Variable Sex
Statistical
Test
Null 
Rejected
2a
2b
3a
3b
4a
4b
5a
5b
6a
6b
Longevity at first Male Chi-square 
position
Longevity at first 
position
Female Chi-square
Years to promotion Male
(Associate)
Years to promotion Female
(Associate)
Years to promotion Male
(Full)
Years to promotion Female
(Full)
Rank Male
Rank Female
Years to tenure Male
Years to tenure Female
Analysis of 
Covariance
Analysis of 
Covariance
Analysis of 
Covariance
Analysis of 
Covariance
Chi-square
Chi-square
Analysis of 
Covariance
Analysis of 
Covariance
yes
yes
no
yes
no
no
yes
no
no
no
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Initially this seemed contrary to the usual concern that inbred 
faculty are terminated solely because of their institutional ori­
gin. In fact, a critical variable was missing from the analysis —  
the individual's aspirations for mobility. Calculations based on 
the number of faculty who have not moved are biased by the poten­
tially higher propensity toward mobility of noninbred faculty.
A narrower interpretation of the question, differentiating 
between voluntary and involuntary mobility, would have provided 
more insight into the treatment of inbred faculty. For example, 
an hypothesis about the relative frequency of involuntary termi­
nation would better serve the purpose of identifying differences 
in retention policy. Unfortunately, the 1977 Survey data could 
not support this type of analysis.
Beyond the first year, a higher percentage of inbred faculty 
were in the first job. If the cross-sectional results over ten 
cohorts do reflect trends, it is more likely that inbreds are 
immobile over time. As such, they are a potential model for all 
immobile faculty
The analyses for hypotheses 3 and 4 included two significant 
improvements over most earlier efforts to evaluate the effects of 
institutional origin. First, a more precise definition of the 
dependent variable was used. As the time to promotion was mea­
sured from the start of the first full-time teaching position, 
the confounding effect of the inclusion of service as a research
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or teaching assistant was avoided. Second, through the sample 
selection and the inclusion of covariates in the analyses, a sig­
nificant amount of irrelevant variation was removed from the final 
test for the significance of the main effect. Only faculty with 
doctoral degrees were included in the analysis and the primary 
institutional productivity variables were used as covariates.
Only one of the analyses for the third and fourth statistical 
hypotheses yielded significant results. For female associate pro­
fessors, inbreeding was significantly related to the time served 
prior to promotion to that rank. The mean time to associate was 
greater for inbred than noninbred women. These results indicate 
that inbreeding is a handicap in a critical career movement for 
women, but not for men.
As there were only eleven inbred female full professors in­
cluded in the analysis for hypothesis 4b, it is probable that the 
lack of significance may reflect the insufficient cell size. It 
may also be the case that the promotion to associate is the signif­
icant hurdle in the career stream for women and once that obstacle 
is passed, the later decisions are not influenced by institutional 
origin.
Another interesting result from these analyses was found in 
the impact of the institutionally-based productivity measures used 
for covariates. For men at both ranks at least one of the covari­
ates had a statistically significant relationship with the depen­
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dent variable. At least in some ways time to promotion for males 
is related to productivity. For females, on the other hand, none 
of the covariates was significant at either rank. With the excep­
tion of the significant result for the main effects for female 
associate professors noted above, there was no significant syste­
matic relationship between time to promotion for women and any of 
the variables. The lack of an apparent relationship between the 
productivity variables and time to promotion for women is disturb­
ing. Since it appears that the time is determined by variables 
other than these important measures of productivity. One possible 
conclusion is that the time to promotion is capriciously deter­
mined. As not all legitimate predictors have been included as co­
variates in these analyses, this conclusion cannot be substantiated. 
It is, however, suspicious that none of the covariates was signifi­
cant.
The analyses for the fifth hypothesis found that the distri­
bution of ranks was significantly different between inbred and non­
inbred males. Examination of the distribution of ranks for the 
two male groups revealed that inbred faculty were concentrated at 
the lowest (instructor) rank and the two highest ranks (full and 
distinguished professor). This distribution supports a bimodal 
theory of inbred performance. If males are inbred either because 
they are at the top or the bottom of their peer groups, the result 
would be high concentrations at the highest and lowest ranks. The
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competent group would progress rapidly to full or distinguished 
professor, and the bottom group would be used and then terminated 
prior to promotion into the mainstream of the faculty ranks.
There is also a possibility of a confounding effect due to 
length of service in this type of cross-sectional analysis. Facul­
ty who are now full professors passed the critical career barriers 
of promotion and tenure in earlier years. The earlier these deci­
sions were made, the greater the market pressure to keep a faculty 
member. The higher percentage of inbreds in.the top ranks may re­
flect the lower institutional power in the job marketplace at the 
time of promotion. It would have been easier to enforce any in- 
breeding prohibitions as the labor markets tightened providing 
more applicants for each job.
In the analysis of the distribution of ranks for women in hy­
pothesis 5b, the null was not rejected. It is interesting to ob­
serve, in comparing the results for hypothesis 5a to those for 5b, 
that there was a much larger concentration of women than men at 
assistant professor and that there were no female distinguished 
professors.
The analysis of time to tenure for hypothesis 6 resulted in 
no significant results for the main effect, inbreeding. Given 
the rigidity of most faculty regulations about the granting of 
tenure, these results were reasonable. It was mildly surprising 
to note that any variable was significant. For males, production
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of books was significantly related to time served prior to the 
receipt of tenure.
The first step in the analysis for the seventh hypothesis was 
the derivation of an equation for the determination of salaries 
for the noninbred faculty. The coefficients in this equation indi­
cated the relative rewards to the various activities included as 
independent variables. Examination of the coefficients provided 
some interesting information about the reward structure in higher 
education.
Higher returns were given to those who produce more books and 
more articles, and who did more administrative work. In general, 
lower rewards were given for larger commitments to teaching and 
counseling students. The coefficients for time spent in research 
were ambiguous. The lack of a constant relationship between time 
spent in research and rewards, and the increasing returns for 
higher levels of book and article productivity probably reflects 
the fact that research rewards are based primarily on output and 
not on effort.
The variables reflecting characteristics, not activities, 
also provided insight into the salary structure. The highest 
field coefficient was for applied professional subjects with the 
social sciences, natural sciences, and humanities and fine arts 
following in order of decreasing coefficients. The values for 
sex and race indicated that premiums were paid for males and non-
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Caucasians. The intercept for the regression equation was $19,216. 
The results indicated that the equation accounted for 59 percent 
of the variance in the salaries. This value is within the range 
of R squares reported in other salary equity studies. Therefore, 
it can be reasonably concluded that this regression equation is 
sufficiently accurate for the determination of salary equity.
The analysis for the seventh hypothesis continued with the 
use of the regression equation to predict salaries for the inbred 
subjects. The t-test performed on the differences between the 
predicted and actual salaries indicated that the mean of the popu­
lation was significantly different than zero. As the residual 
between the predicted and actual salaries impounded any variation 
not resulting from the independent variables, the interpretation 
of the results depended on the completeness of the list predictor 
variables. As the independent variables used in this analysis 
included all generally-accepted legitimate salary determinants as 
well as sex and race (the two primary discriminatory factors), it 
was reasonable to assume that the residuals were the result of 
institutional origin. The mean of the residuals indicated that 
inbred faculty were paid $426 less, on the average, than noninbred 
faculty of equivalent characteristics.
To better understand the magnitude of this difference it is 
useful to compare it to the salary levels of faculty members. To 
do so required the development of a hypothetical faculty member.
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This person was assumed to be a white male, teaching in the humani­
ties, with one or two books and three of four articles. Each week 
he spends nine to ten hours teaching, nine to sixteen hours on 
research, one to four hours counseling students, and five to eight 
hours in administration. It was also assumed that he has four 
years of experience and teaches at an institution at the highest 
prestige level and that he is inbred.
Application of the regression model to this hypothetical 
individual yielded a salary of $14,094. The $426 difference was 
approximately 3% of the computed salary. Although the recent high 
rates of inflation make this seem like a small difference, it was 
statistically significant and would certainly have been material 
to the recipient.
Summary
The results of this research indicated that inbred women can 
be differentiated from inbred men. All of the discriminant analy­
ses were significant at least at the p < .01 level. Differences 
on the means of the variables indicated that women were more in­
volved in teaching and other traditional activities and that men 
were more productive on external factors.
The analysis of the relative treatment of inbred faculty on 
professional advancement variables found only four significant re­
sults. Regardless of sex, inbred faculty were more likely to be 
in their first position. Inbred men were concentrated in high
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and low ranks and inbred women served more time prior to promotion 
to associate.
The use of a regression model based on noninbred faculty to 
predict the salaries of inbred faculty indicated a premium was paid 
for noninbred status. The difference was statistically significant 
at the p < .05 level.
Chapter 5
INSTITUTIONAL ORIGIN AND LABOR MARKET POLICY 
The origin of this research study was in an interest in the 
operation of the academic marketplace. The goal was not to pro­
vide an esoteric analysis, but rather to expand the knowledge of 
the labor market in a manner which would provide results which 
would be of use to participants in the marketplace. However, cer­
tain definitional and methodological advances were included. In 
this research, the standard definition of productivity was expanded 
and multivariate analyses were used. These technical contribu­
tions are discussed in the first section of this chapter and the 
limitations of the study are covered in the second section. The 
final sections review the results of the research and the implica­
tions of these results for institutional policy.
Technical Advancements 
Most research on academic productivity utilizes definitions 
which are based only on research activities. Commonly-used vari­
ables include the number of articles and the number of books 
written. This research included information on teaching, adminis­
tration, acquisition of research grants, work as a consultant, 
and type of research undertaken. It was felt that the standard 
research-based definition of productivity did not properly reflect 
the variety of value-producing activities routinely undertaken by
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faculty members.
In addition to expanding the number of activities, several of 
the analyses included an adjustment to the book, article, and 
other writing variables for the amount of time spent on research 
each week. This provided for a further inclusion of the task mix 
in the determination of productivity.
The present research also used an hypothesis testing addition 
to the standard regression methodology for salary discrimination. 
The use of a t-test on the residuals of the comparison of predicted 
and actual salaries for the unfavored group allows the determina­
tion of the statistical significance of discriminations.
Limitations
No analysis can be better than the data used as input. The 
1977 Survey provided primarily cross-sectional data with some indi­
cators of longitudinal data, such as times of promotion and years 
in higher education. Longitudinal data would probably have given 
a better view of the academic production and reward processes. 
However, such data was not readily available and its acquisition 
for such a large sample was virtually impossible.
Another limitation of the data was its source. The 1977 Sur­
vey data was collected directly from the subjects. Although self- 
reported data is generally suspect, Allison and Stewart (1974) 
found a correlation of .94 between self-reponted number of publi­
cations and results from a survey of abstracts. As there is no
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reason to believe that the propensity to give false data was greater 
for any group of interest in this research, the potential self- 
report bias was not judged to be a severe problem.
A final limitation of the study involved the number of sub­
jects. With only fifty inbred women, the results, especially where 
only part of the pool was included may have been influenced by the 
small number of subjects. This effect was most probable in the 
analysis for statistical hypothesis 4b. There were only eleven 
female, inbred full professors. It was, however, unrealistic to 
conclude that the small number of female inbred faculty is due to 
sampling errors. Given the low percentages of women and inbred 
faculty, the small number of people meeting both these criteria 
was realistic.
The Treatment of Inbred Faculty
One of the objectives of this research was to expand the 
knowledge of the labor market in a way which would yield results 
valuable to participants in the marketplace. With this goal in 
mind, it is reasonable to reverse the order of the research hypo­
theses and first ask if there is discrimination against inbred 
faculty.
The review of the literature in chapter two showed that the 
one idea that all of the studies agreed on was the undesirability 
of inbreeding. The pessimism reflected in Eliot's (1908) early 
warning pervades the literature. Regardless of whether studies
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were designed to support or refute the thesis that inbred faculty 
are less productive, the underlying assumption was that the pheno­
menon has a negative impact.
The opportunity for the distaste against inbreeding to be 
acted upon in the form of discrimination has certainly existed in 
both the internal and external academic labor markets. As early 
as 1935, the potential for differential treatment was recognized 
in the literature. Eells and Cleveland (1935a) speculated that 
inbred faculty were hired as a matter of economy. McGee (I960) 
argued that universities manipulated the demands on and rewards to 
inbred faculty to allow surplus resources to be diverted for non­
inbred faculty. The question of the existence of discrimination 
against inbred faculty was addressed in the second and third hypo­
theses. The former considered bias in decisions concerning pro­
fessional advancement; the latter examined the distribution of 
institutional rewards.
Research hypotheses two through six were designed to test for 
discrimination in the major categories reflecting professional 
advancement: retention in the first position, years to promotion 
(both to associate and to full professor), rank, and years to 
acquisition of tenure. All of these measures of professional 
advancement were under the control of the university and, there­
fore, potentially subject to bias based on institutional origin.
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The only analysis in the present study which clearly indi­
cated the existence of discrimination against inbred faculty was 
the examination of time to promotion to the rank of associate pro­
fessor for female faculty (statistical hypothesis 3b). The main 
effect, inbreeding, was found to be statistically significant 
while the effects of the productivity covariates were not. Inbred 
women served longer periods of time before promotion to associate 
than noninbred women and the difference cannot be explained by 
major productivity factors. Although this result reflected only 
one measure of professional advancement, its effects should not be 
minimized. Promotion to associate is a critical step in the pro­
fessional career path and one which might, in itself, influence 
later decisions.
The result of the analysis of the distribution of ranks among 
inbred and outbred male faculty was also significant. However, 
the interpretation of the results was more difficult and a clear 
judgement of discrimination against inbred faculty could not be 
substantiated. A higher concentration of inbred faculty was found 
at the rank of instructor —  a result which would indicate bias. 
But higher concentrations of inbreds were also found at the two 
highest ranks —  a result which was contrary to the notion of dis­
crimination. Without further analysis to explain the bimodal na­
ture of the relative distribution, the significant results cannot 
be used to demonstrate discrimination.
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Stronger evidence, both in terms of results and methodology, 
indicating the existence of bias against inbred faculty was found 
in the examination of institutional rewards. Testing for the dif­
ferences in compensation is a difficult problem because of the 
large number of variables which impact on the determination of 
rewards. Multiple regression analysis has become the technique of 
choice for the modeling of salaries because of its capacity to 
include the variance from many characteristics through their inclu­
sion as independent variables. This type of analysis is methodo­
logically stronger than the comparison of means which was used in 
previous inbreeding studies.
The results of the analysis on institutional rewards indicated 
that there were significant differences in compensation based on 
institutional origin. Further examination of the data revealed 
that inbred faculty were paid on the ayerage significantly less 
than noninbred faculty of equivalent characteristics.
Armed with the results of the second and third research hypo­
theses which indicate that some discrimination against inbred 
faculty existed, especially in the critical area of monetary com­
pensation, it would seem reasonable to move on to a prescription 
for the abandonment of prohibitions and biases against inbred 
faculty. However, it is first useful to return to the major 
research hypothesis and ask whether inbred women are different 
than inbred men. The context for answering this question is the
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economic theory based on job market signaling behavior which was 
used to guide this research.
The Performance of Male and Female Inbred Faculty 
As explained in chapter 1, the job market (internal or exter­
nal) uses signals, given by prospective employees, to evaluate 
potential productivity. The employer tailors the conditions of 
the employment offer, and possibly the very fact of the offer it­
self, according to the productivity expected from the individual 
job seeker. The greater the correspondence between the signals 
given by the prospective employees and their later productivity, 
the greater the efficiency of the labor market. The mechanism 
which facilitates the extension of signals by job seekers is the 
cost of signaling. The information-based models of the labor mar­
ket normally assume equal signaling costs across all job seekers.
The assumption of equal signaling costs is not appropriate 
when analyzing the impact of institutional origin in the academic 
marketplace. Because of often limited geographic mobility due to 
personal concerns, women may experience a higher cost to signal 
outbred than men. As a result, women who are in fact highly pro­
ductive may give the low productivity signal (inbred). If it is 
then assumed that they must be low producers because they are 
inbred, the market is discriminating against the highly productive 
women by using a signal which does not reflect reality.
The important question is whether inbred women are indeed
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different than inbred men and whether the differences indicate 
higher productivity. The analyses for the first statistical hypo­
thesis were directed at determining if significant differences 
exist between male and female inbred faculty. The results indicat­
ed that significant differences do exist. Further examination of 
the data indicated that women show higher performance in most tra­
ditional institutional areas while men seem to emphasize external 
activities. Women had higher productivity for both article cate­
gories and one of the two book categories used in the study. They 
also spent more time in formal instruction. The male orientation 
toward external activities was demonstrated in higher above salary 
earnings and higher probabilities for the receipt of research fund­
ing and appointment as a paid consultant. To the extent that 
institutions favor traditional teaching and research services over 
those activities which benefit external parties, women should 
receive higher institutional rewards.
Implications
This research has shown that inbreeding is a signal which is 
treated negatively in the academic labor market. There is negative 
treatment in reward decisions and to a lesser extent in measures 
of professional advancement. The negative valence attached to 
inbreeding indicates that it is assumed to be a signal of low 
productivity. While previous studies have indicated that inbreed­
ing is, in fact, an indicator of lowered productivity, none of
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these studies has taken into account the possible differences be­
tween male and female inbred faculty. Significantly, the results 
of this study indicate that inbred women are more productive in 
institutional services than inbred men.
As the results of this research indicated that inbred women 
are significantly different than inbred men, a recommendation of 
differential treatment seems to be in order. Even if the inbreed­
ing signal has worked correctly for males, there is reason now to 
question its applicability to women. Although further research on 
the relationship between inbreeding and productivity is needed to 
determine whether the signal is properly applied to males, it is 
in the interest of market efficiency to argue for the abandonment 
of inbreeding as a signal altogether because it is no longer sui­
tably reliable as an indicator of productivity across all appli­
cants. The cost of defending and maintaining a rule used only for 
one sex would not be balanced by the gains from the use of such a 
rule. Individual promotion and retention decisions should be based 
on the characteristics actually exhibited by the person being 
evaluated and not on the surrogate of institutional origin.
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APPENDIX A 
Questionnaire Items by Variable Category
I. Inbreeding
32. Please list (beginning with the most recent) the academic 
degrees which you have been awarded, the institution grant­
ing each, and the year in which each was obtained.
Degree Institution Year
34. At how many colleges or universities have you been employed 
f u l l - t i m e  (beyond the level of teaching or research assis­
tant) ?
Only this one
Two.........
Three.......
Four........
II. Research Productivity
A. Journal Articles
48. How many articles have you published in academic or pro­
fessional journals?
None............. 11-20..............
1-2  21-30..............
3-4..............  31-50..............
5-10  More than 50.......
49. How many of your professional writings have been published 
or accepted for publication in the last two years?
One............  Five...............
Two............  Six-ten............
Three..........  More than ten.......
Four...........  None...............
Five........
Six........
Seven or more
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E. Books or Monographs
47. How many books or monographs have you published or edited, 
alone or in collaboration?
None 
1-2.
3-4.
See also Question 41 (supra)
C. Research Findings
50. Have you ever received research funding from any source?
Yes......... No........
51. In the past 12 months, have you received any?
Yes........  No.........
52. [IF YES] from which of the following did you receive 
funding? (Mark all that apply) Past 12
Ever Months
a. Institutional or departmental funds...
b . Federal agencies....................
c. State or local government agencies....
d. Private foundations.................
e. Private industry....................
III. Prestige
71. Within the past two years, have you received an offer of 
another job or a serious inquiry about your availability 
for another position?
An offer..................................
Not an offer, but a serious inquiry.......
Neither...................................
72. Within the past two years, have you sought, or made a serious 
inquiry about another position?
Sought another position.....................
Not sought, but made a serious inquiry .
Neither....................................
79. Comparing yourself with other academic persons of your age 
and qualifications, how successful do you consider yourself 
in your career?
5-10.......
More than 10
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Very successful.. 
Fairly successful
Fairly unsuccessful 
Very unsuccessful..
IV. Other Descriptive Variables 
Teaching effort
42. During the current term, how many hours per week are you
spending in formal instruction in class? (If on leave, 
indicate what your normal teaching load would be.)
41. During the present term, how many hours per week, on the 
average, are you actually spending in connection with your 
staff position in each of the following activities:
a. Administration..........
b. Scheduled teaching (actual 
hours)..................
c. Preparing for teaching 
(including reading papers, 
grading)................
d. Advising and counseling 
students................
e. Research and scholarly 
writing.................
Consulting
53. Have you ever served as a paid consultant?
Yes........  No.........
54. In the past two years have you served in such a capacity?
Yes........  No.........
55. [IF YES] To which of the following have you served?
(Mark all that apply)
None
1-4.
5-6.
7-8.
9-10
11-12....
13-16....
17-20....
21 or more
<uao ■<r oom
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Ever Past Two Years
a. Local business.............
b. Local government or school...
c. National corporation........
d. Federal government.........
e. Other......................
Role Description
56. Some faculty members are inclined to think of themselves as 
"intellectuals." Others find "scholar," "scientist," 
"teacher," or "professional" more satisfactory descriptors. 
Which of these terms describes you best? Which is the poorest 
descriptor?
a. Best b. Poorest
Intellectual.................
Professional.................
Scholar......................
Scientist....................
Teacher......................
57. Do your interests lie primarily in research or in teaching?
Very heavily in research.............
In both, but leaning toward research...
In both, but leaning toward teaching...
Very heavily in teaching.............
See also Question 41 (supra).
58. Would you characterize your recent scholarship, research, or 
creative writing as:
Yes No
a. Pure or basic..............
b. Applied....................
c. Policy oriented............
d. Literary or expressive......
59. In many disciplines, faculty members differ in seeing their
work as primarily in the area of theory, or as largely sub­
stantive or experimental. Is your work:
Largely theoretical...............................
Largely substantive or experimental................
The distinction is not applicable in my discipline...
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V. Compensation
43. What is your basic institutional salary, before taxes and 
deductions, for the current academic year?
Below $10,000....... $25,000-$29,999..
$10,000-$11,999..... $30,000-$34,999..
$12,000-$13,999..... $35,000-$39,999..
$14,000-$16,999..... $40,000-$44,999..
$17,000-$19,999..... $45,000-$49,999..
$20,000-$24,999..... $50,000 and over.
44. Is this based on
9/10 months........  11/12 months
45. In recent years, roughly how much have you earned over and
above your basic salary? (Please estimate as a percentage of 
your basic salary.)
0%...........  30%-39%.....
Under 10%....  40%-49%.....
10%-19%....... 50% and over.
20%-29%.......
VI. Demographics 
Rank
38. What is your present rank?
Distinguished/"Named"
Professorship.....
Lecturer...........
No ranks designated.. 
Other..............
Instructor...........
Assistant Professor.... 
Associate Professor.... 
Professor..........
35. How long have you been employed on a full-time basis in higher 
education?...at your present institution? How many years have 
you held your present rank?
a. In higher education
b. At your institution
c. In present rank ,r a b c
0-2 years..................................
3-5 years  .............................
6-10 years.................................
11-15 years...............................
16-20 years................................
More than 20 years..........................
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Tenure Status
39. What kind of appointment do you now hold?
Regular with tenure... 
Regular without tenure 
Yearly appointment
Acting.. 
Visiting 
Other...
(soft money)  .......
40. [IF TENURED] in what year were you awarded tenure?
Field, Sex, Age, & Race
46. From the following list, mark one subject in each column; 
mark the most appropriate fine categories, if applicable; 
where your precise field does not appear, mark the most 
similar category.
a. Highest postgraduate degree
b. School, division, or department where principal 
appointment is held
c. Present principal teaching field
d. Present primary field of research, scholarship, creativity
108. Your sex:
Female........  Male.........
109. How old are you?________________
112. Your race:
Black/Negro/Afro-American. .....
White/Caucas ian..................
Oriental.........................
Other............................
106. What is your marital status?
Never married.........................
Married, living with spouse...........
Married, separated from spouse.........
Divorced..............................
Widowed..............................
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In response to the need for further research on promotion and 
tenure decisions, this study examined one of the criteria used in 
these decisions: inbreeding. Based on an analysis of the academic
marketplace modifying Spence's theory of job market signaling 
behavior, the following research hypotheses guided the study:
1) female inbred facility have patterns of productivity which are 
significantly different from the patterns of productivity of male 
inbred faculty; 2) inbred faculty show less professional advance­
ment than noninbred faculty; and, 3) inbred faculty receive fewer 
institutional rewards than noninbred faculty.
The data for the research was taken from the 1977 Survey of the 
American Professoriate. This instrument was designed and implemented 
under the direction of Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. and Seymour Martin 
Lipset. Seven statistical hypotheses were tested covering the 
productivity of male and female inbred faculty, their professional 
advancement, and their rewards. Methodological factors included 
a broad operationalization of academic productivity, the use 
of multivariate analyses, and the inclusion of a test for the 
statistical significance of discrimination in rewards.
The results of the analyses showed that inbred faculty do experience 
discrimination in rewards and in some areas of professional advancement. 
Significant differences were found in the patterns of productivity 
exhibited by female and male inbred faculty members. Women show 
higher performance in most traditional institutional areas while 
men emphasize external activities. The results indicate that 
institutional origin cannot be used as a reliable signal in the 
academic labor market.
